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1 2	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK	
3	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	
4	V •	19 CR 127 (PAE)
5	LUCIO CELLI,	
6	Defendant.	
7	x	
8		New York, N.Y. April 6, 2020
9		2:05 p.m.
10	Before:	
11	HON. PAUL A. ENGELMAYER,	
12	District Judge	
13		Sitting By Designation
14	APPEARANCES	
15	MARK J. LESKO,	
16	United States Attorney for the	
17	Eastern District of New York ANNA KARMIGIOS	
18	NADIA SHIHATA Assistant United States Attorneys	
19	BENJAMIN SILVERMAN	
20	Attorney for Defendant	
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L46KCELC 1 (Case called) MS. KARMIGIOS: Anna Karmigios and Nadia Shihata, for 2 3 the government. Good afternoon, your Honor. 4 THE COURT: Good afternoon, Ms. Karmigios. 5 And good afternoon, Ms. Shihata. MS. SHIHATA: Good afternoon. 6 7 MR. SILVERMAN: Good afternoon, your Honor. Benjamin Silverman, and seated to my left is Lucio Celli, and I believe 8 9 on the phone is Dorea Silverman. 10 THE DEFENDANT: Good afternoon, your Honor. 11 THE COURT: Very good. Good afternoon, Mr. Silverman. 12 Good afternoon, Mr. Celli. 13 Good afternoon, by phone, to Ms. Silverman. 14 And good afternoon to anyone else who is auditing the conference by phone. 15 Good afternoon, as well, to Mr. Walker, our court 16 17 reporter. 18 Let me begin just by acknowledging the obvious, which is that we're here under the strange situation of COVID 19 20 conditions, and I appreciate -- first of all, I hope everyone 21 is doing well from a health perspective; second of all, I 22 appreciate the awkwardness of our being in masks. For just a 23 quick second, I'm going to take down the mask because I think

THE DEFENDANT: I saw you, your Honor. Sorry.

Mr. Celli is entitled to see the face of the judge who is --

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THE COURT: I'm just being gracious, sir. I just 1 wanted you to have an opportunity to see me, so that the face 2 3 of justice is not masked for the entirety of this proceeding. 4 I won't speak while I have the mask down. 5 (Pause) 6 THE COURT: And I understand that Mr. Smallman has 7 asked everybody, please, not to stand when you speak, so I'll ask you to abide by that request in the interests of public 8 9 safety. 10 I have a handful of matters to take up. The very 11 first one is just to put on the record the fact of everybody's 12 consent to doing today's proceeding here in the Southern 13 District, for which I am appreciative as well to everyone. 14 Mr. Silverman, I've got your email of March 31, at 15 3:05, saying that you consent to proceeding here today. Just to confirm on the record that you do? 16 17 MR. SILVERMAN: Yes, your Honor. Thank you. 18 THE COURT: Very good. And, Ms. Karmigios, I have your email of March 30th to 19 20 the same effect. I take it, just to confirm, the government, 21 as well, consents to doing this here today? 22 MS. KARMIGIOS: Yes, your Honor. 23 THE COURT: All right. Very good. 24 The two principal areas of business for today are my

resolution of the pending motions in limine and then what's

called a Faretta inquiry, or an inquiry to Mr. Celli, presented by the fact that, according to Mr. Silverman, Mr. Celli is interested in or is exploring representing himself at trial.

And I'll take those in that order.

In connection with the motions in limine, I have a handful of factual questions for counsel that may shape the resolution or discussion of a couple of the motions.

Before I do that, though, there's just one issue that I wanted to take up, and it is prompted by a statement that was made, Mr. Silverman, by you in your email to counsel and the Court of March the 29th, and this was in connection with scheduling a conference for the purpose of exploring Mr. Celli's interest in representing himself, and you write, "I note that Mr. Celli states that he intends to call me as a witness at trial, so it may be necessary for the Court to appoint new counsel as a standby attorney."

Putting aside any other issue involving Mr. Celli's request to represent himself, I just wanted to briefly break off the piece that says that you may be a trial witness.

MR. SILVERMAN: I understand, your Honor.

THE COURT: May I ask you if you have an understanding as to what subject you are competent to testify about that could be litigated at this trial?

MR. SILVERMAN: In my view, there is no subject that I have relevant testimony to provide. This is getting to one of

the issues as to why Mr. Celli would like new counsel. We have different views, or Mr. Celli has had different views, with his various counsel about what's relevant and should be offered at trial.

As a pure legal matter, I don't think I have relevant trial evidence to offer.

THE COURT: I mean, I take it you did not meet

Mr. Celli until more than a year -- much more than a year after

the events at issue?

MR. SILVERMAN: I first met Mr. Celli in October of last year. I never had any contact with him before I was appointed on October 16th, 2020.

THE COURT: All right. Look, the reason I'm asking is that if, in fact, you were a bona fide fact witness, there would be a whole other set of issues to deal with. If there is not a credible theory under which you would be eligible to be a trial witness, I'd like to remove that as a portion of the discussion.

Mr. Silverman, let me ask you, when I take up with your client whether there's a concrete basis on which to believe you're qualified to serve as a trial witness, it's just to tie up that loose end? Shall I take that up with your client?

MR. SILVERMAN: Your Honor, can I ask permission to move over to Mr. Celli and to make it quicker than the phone?

L46KCELC 1 THE DEFENDANT: Oh, whatever. MR. SILVERMAN: I can use the phone as well. 2 3 THE COURT: It's a matter of your comfort together, 4 and I don't want to probe about vaccination, but if there's any 5 discomfort either of you have, you should be using those 6 phones. 7 I appreciate that. I'm comfortable MR. SILVERMAN: moving to my client very quickly, if that's okay with the 8 9 Court. 10 THE COURT: Mr. Celli, are you comfortable with that, 11 too? 12 Go ahead. Okay. 13 (Pause) 14 MR. SILVERMAN: Your Honor, Mr. Celli would like to 15 address the Court on this topic. 16 THE COURT: Sure. 17 Mr. Celli, let me just explain to you why I'm raising this question. If Mr. Silverman were, in fact, qualified to be 18 a trial witness, if, for example, he was a fact witness who was 19 20 an eyewitness to some of the events that may be at issue or 21 something like that, that would present a whole different

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that interest is coming from you, I didn't want to skip that 1 2 subject without giving you a chance to speak. I will ask you, 3 though, just to -- a couple of things. Just keep your remarks 4 to just that subject - there's plenty of other ground to 5 cover - and particularly because of the masking, speak slowly 6 and distinctly, so the court reporter can take down --7 THE DEFENDANT: Sure. 8 THE COURT: -- what you say. 9 THE DEFENDANT: So the reason, and it's not only 10 Mr. Silverman, it's all the prior lawyers as well, there is 11 evidence that was not presented at bail. So I have asked other 12 people in the DOJ outside the Second Circuit. They even see 13 it, what was done to me, as wrong. I was deprived of all 14 procedural due process. Everybody except Mr. Silverman told me about -- the U.S. Marshals told me I wasn't in danger, and 15 there's a report, supposedly - I never seen it yet - but, 16 according to Mr. Silverman, there is a report. So that should 17 have been presented at bail, and because of what happened at 18 19 bail, I'm being denied retro money, which is also a term of 20 retaliation for my exposure of Judge Cogan, who worked for the 21 UFT for over 20 years. 22 THE COURT: Okay.

THE DEFENDANT: So that's the issue.

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THE COURT: Thank you. Look, I appreciate you clarifying your thinking.

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I do have to say, though, that the issue at trial will not be about what happened at bail or anything like that. issue at trial is simply going to be framed by the charge brought against you, whether you did or didn't, within the elements of Section 875(c) of Title 18, commit that offense. And so, whatever else happened in the history of the case after you were charged, none of that speaks to whether or not you're quilty or not quilty of that offense. So, whatever issues you have with respect to any of the lawyers who've represented you, none of them is what we call a fact witness, none of them is qualified to speak to the ultimate issues - you know, was there a threat, was it in interstate commerce, was it to injure the person of another -- that sort of thing, what was your intent at the time. Those are the issues on which --THE DEFENDANT: That's the other --Sorry, Mr. Celli. THE COURT: THE DEFENDANT: Sorry. THE COURT: It's very important, particularly because we have a court reporter, always let me finish, as I will let you finish. THE DEFENDANT: I apologize. THE COURT: No worries. So, with respect, I appreciate that you may have misgivings about some of the people who have represented you.

I'm not in any way crediting that as a valid misgiving, but you

1 may have those, but that's a separate issue from whether 2 Mr. Silverman or any of those people, if they were still by 3 your side, would be a trial witness at trial. There's really 4 no basis that I've heard under which Mr. Silverman could be 5 sitting here or its equivalent in the Eastern District during your trial. 6 7 THE DEFENDANT: They saw that Judge Cogan fixed my --8 not only did he fix my state case, he fixed my bail hearing. 9 THE COURT: Let me ask you, Mr. Celli --10 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 11 THE COURT: -- are you saying Mr. Silverman saw Judge 12 Cogan fix the hearing? 13 THE DEFENDANT: No, but I have U.S. Marshals said that 14 they would fix my state case, and you know that under Federal 15 Rules of discovery -- Federal Rules of Evidence, opposing statements are admissible, and those were the statements said 16 17 by the U.S. Marshals. 18 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Celli, putting aside what 19 the rules might be as to statements by the marshal - I'm trying 20 to keep focused here - the only reason I've raised this subject 21 is because there was a suggestion that Mr. Silverman might be 22 legally unqualified to represent you at trial because he would 23 be wearing a separate hat as a fact witness.

THE DEFENDANT: Okay.

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THE COURT: Putting aside what evidence may be

received, Mr. Silverman had nothing to do with any of those events. He entered this case at my appointment less than a year ago, or about a year ago — or less than a year ago, so he is — well less than a year ago. So, with respect, I want to move on to other business, but the only issue here is, is there some proposition at trial that Mr. Silverman is a firsthand witness to that he can testify?

THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, because they're telling me what my intent was. Only I can say what my intent was.

THE COURT: Well, the point is --

THE DEFENDANT: And that's missing from the briefs. So I don't know how you're going to render a decision today when there are issues that I need to fix.

THE COURT: Okay. As I said, the only issue that I've raised with you right now involves Mr. Silverman. And from the discussion I've had, my instinct is, I think, confirmed that Mr. Silverman is not a fact witness; he had nothing to do with, and was not present on the scene of, any of the events at issue.

The next issue I want to take up involves the motions in limine. And I have several just discrete questions, and I'm going to begin by putting a couple to the government.

With respect to the postarrest statement that Mr. Celli gave on November 14th, you have identified subsets of that statement, the yellow highlights, that you intend to

admit. I noted at the beginning that you do not intend to elicit the Miranda warnings. Would it be your intention, during the examination of the witness, to bring out the fact that there had been a Miranda warning?

MS. KARMIGIOS: Yes, your Honor, we would elicit that there had been a Miranda warning.

Yes, your Honor, we do intend to elicit that there had been a Miranda warning and a waiver of his Miranda rights.

THE COURT: The next question is: An issue has arisen about whether to play the audio alone or the video, and the concern that was raised by the defense, in part, was that Mr. Celli is handcuffed. One of the issues is what a jury might or might not infer from seeing the handcuffing.

Is it your intention, in order to minimize any potential prejudice that could flow from the video showing the handcuffing, to contextualize that briefly for the jury? For example, I am aware, in other settings, that in certain situations, handcuffing somebody in a cellblock is literally a matter of ordinary procedure, it doesn't reflect an individualized judgment about them; it's if you're in the cellblock, you're handcuffed. And the question is: Is there evidence of that nature that can and would be elicited here to give the jury a neutral explanation that does not focus on anything specific to Mr. Celli for why the handcuffing is occurring?

MS. KARMIGIOS: Your Honor, I do believe that the witness will testify about the postarrest statement, would testify to the fact that the handcuffs were part of a routine procedure. That's my current understanding. I'd also add that the government does intend to play the video. We think it's probative of Mr. Celli's demeanor, and we also think based --

argument, because I read the briefs, I'm prepared to rule, but the missing ingredient for me was whether there would be any evidence that explains to the jury what the handcuffing does.

I understand your reasons for believing the video is more probative, and more useful, and clearer than the audio — I fully get that — but on the other side of the equation, I have to consider how the jury would react to seeing the handcuffs.

And one question is: Are they going to be given some context, so that the jury understands that the handcuffing is a matter of routine in that space and not some judgment about Mr. Celli?

MS. KARMIGIOS: Yes, your Honor. With the caveat that

witness prep is ongoing, and it's still in its early stages, it is my current understanding that the witness would testify that this was a routine procedure.

THE COURT: All right. Okay.

The next question is for you, Mr. Silverman. On page 8 of the transcript of the prison calls, there is a disputed section, which the defense would like added. It falls

between two of the highlighted sections that the government is offering. Tell me when you're there.

MR. SILVERMAN: Yes, your Honor. Does your Honor mean the postarrest statement?

THE COURT: I'm sorry if I was not clear. Yes, the postarrest statement. Sorry, I think I may have said prison call. The postarrest statement. On page 8, from lines 13 through 28, is a nonhighlighted portion which you would like put in.

MR. SILVERMAN: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: I fully understand the arguments you've made, and I'm respectful of them. It looked to me as if what you were trying to put in stops after the word "me" on line either 24 or 25, that you were not seeking to add the next sentence or two, which appears to be a bit of a brief switch of thought. I want to make sure I understand what you are asking to be put in. I understand you want to put in the marshal's question and your client's response up to the word "me" on line 24 or 25 and that you weren't pursuing the last two lines.

MR. SILVERMAN: Yes, your Honor, that's correct.

THE COURT: Okay. It wasn't quite clear, and I wanted to make sure that was the nature of the offer.

The next question I have involves the prison calls, and this goes to the government. The government proposes to offer excerpts of two, quote-unquote, prison calls, meaning

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calls that were tape-recorded of Mr. Celli during his postarrest incarceration before his release. By the way, could you remind me, just because I'm a successor judge in the case, what were the circumstances under which Mr. Celli was held and under which he came to be released?

MS. KARMIGIOS: Your Honor, I'm also new to this case, and I didn't -- I wasn't on this case at that time, so I don't want to misspeak, but I'm happy to submit a letter if the Court would like further information about that.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, that was background. important question is as follows: The parties are in agreement about that the excerpts are properly offered, and, unlike the postarrest statement, there is not a request that additional material from the same calls be added as context. Absent from the government's brief, though, is any acknowledgment that Mr. Celli is in prison during these calls, and that the fact that he is in prison, which is what permits him to be tape-recorded, might itself have an adverse -- be adverse to Mr. Celli. In other words, from a Rule 403 perspective, sure, there's the probative value, such as it is of the excerpts you want to offer, but some attention needs to be given to the fact that he is in prison at the time. Unless you see it otherwise, I don't see a way in which those calls can be admitted without the jury being alerted to the fact that he was in custody at the time; otherwise, it's just unexplained what was happening

that led to a phone call of his to be taped, and I believe even some of the excerpts of the calls themselves imply, at least, that he is in custody.

Have you given thought to a way of mitigating whatever prejudice there might be presented by the fact that the jury would learn that Mr. Celli was in custody at the time of those two calls?

MS. KARMIGIOS: Your Honor, we would request potentially a limiting instruction to the jury about that.

THE COURT: What would it say?

MS. KARMIGIOS: That the -- well, my instinct would be that the jury shouldn't consider or put too much weight on the fact that Mr. Celli was incarcerated during the calls, but I'm happy, again, to submit further briefing on that point.

THE COURT: Well, as I understand it, he's arrested on November 14th. One of the calls is as late as December; I think the other one is later in November. So, the one in December inferentially would, presumably, suggest to a jury that Mr. Celli had been in custody for perhaps from November 14th through the date of that call in December. The concern is that some juror might conclude that the fact that Mr. Celli had been in custody for that period must be speak something concerning about him. And I'm trying to -- yes, of course, a limiting instruction could tell the jury not to think that or not to focus on that, and limiting instructions have

their value. Is this something the government had given thought to before it was raised by the Court today?

MS. KARMIGIOS: Honestly, your Honor, no, I had not thought about this particular issue and what the limiting instruction should look like, but I'm happy to do so and submit further briefing to the Court.

THE COURT: Mr. Silverman, have you any additional views on the matter?

MR. SILVERMAN: I appreciate your Honor's raising this. You're correct, I didn't respond to it because I didn't recognize anything that the government was putting in that would explicitly make clear that these were prison calls, and, certainly, there are jury instructions that are given about means and methods of government surveillance that are routine that the jury could not infer why or how what was being done. I've seen cases where the government seeks to offer as an exhibit the poster next to the phones on Rikers Island that gives you the warnings that the calls are recorded, and, obviously, nothing like that's being offered here. If that were to be added to the government's motion, I would respectfully request leave to put in a very short one-page supplemental letter.

THE COURT: No, of course. Look, I appreciate your thoughtful perspective on it. The question is: Right now, if the tapes were to be played, would the jury be told anything

about where Mr. Celli had been at the time the calls were tape-recorded or how they came to be tape-recorded?

MR. SILVERMAN: I would object to that on Rule 403 grounds. I don't think that's relevant information. I don't think it's important for the jury to know how or why the calls were recorded. Juries regularly receive evidence, including recordings, without knowing exactly how the recordings came to be. Frequently they do, but not always.

THE COURT: So your proposition would be, in effect, the less said, the better. Whether authenticated by a witness or by stipulation, the fact that these were excerpts of phone calls that Mr. Celli had on the dates indicated, assuming that there's a competent witness to authenticate the tapes, the tapes would come in, but nothing would be said about where Mr. Celli was, and the hope would then be — and there would be an instruction that — Mr. Celli, I need to finish speaking. You're waving your hand.

THE DEFENDANT: Okay.

THE COURT: I've got you. Let me finish with Mr. Silverman, and then you can confer with him.

Your proposition, Mr. Silverman, is the less said, the better; essentially, authenticate them as tapes, do not situate them in space, in venue, and give a limiting instruction that instructs the jury not to speculate?

MR. SILVERMAN: Exactly, your Honor. And insofar as

your Honor is correct that one of the statements he made refers to why I'm here, I think that that doesn't necessarily -- and the context is clear what he's saying. We understand what he's saying, but I don't think that it's necessarily clear where "here" is without the context, and I don't think that the contents of the statements make clear that he is incarcerated at the time.

THE COURT: All right.

It may be that Mr. Celli wanted you to communicate something to me. Why don't you speak.

(Pause)

MR. SILVERMAN: Your Honor, respectfully, as a proposal, Mr. Celli wishes to address this. This has prompted him to remember the bail motion, which I filed on his behalf on January 4th, which he alluded to earlier, and which perhaps would best be left until possibly after a Faretta hearing.

THE COURT: We'll leave that for later.

Here's my thought for the government: Mr. Silverman may well have the right answer here, that may be the one that's most respectful of his client's interests. I would like the government to give thought to the means and methods by which the prison tapes would be received, i.e., assuming there's no stipulation, who the witness is and what would be said, and what, if any, instruction should go with those.

I'll give you a date to respond, and then,

Mr. Silverman, I'd like you to have a follow-on letter responding to that, so that I have the benefit of the defense's view.

The government has told me about a straightforward problem. How long until you can get me a letter?

MS. KARMIGIOS: Your Honor, I think I can have it done by Friday.

THE COURT: Very good.

So Friday, April 9th, for a letter just limited to that issue about prison calls. I'm not reopening the content of the calls — I'll rule on that in a moment — but the issue here just involves the means by which to mitigate any prejudice to Mr. Celli. Mr. Silverman may have the right answer, but I'm eager to get everyone to think about it.

Mr. Silverman, can I have a letter from you three days thereafter, three business days, maybe April 14th?

MR. SILVERMAN: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Very good.

Mr. Silverman, I can't tell -- excuse me. Mr. Celli, your hand is up when your elbow is resting on the table. I can't tell whether you want to speak, but, as a general matter, it is better to go through your attorney, lest you say something that harms your interests.

MR. SILVERMAN: Your Honor, may I have a minute -THE COURT: Yes.

(Defendant and counsel conferred)

MR. SILVERMAN: Your Honor, Mr. Celli wishes to address the Court.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Celli, I'm focusing right now solely on the issue of the prison tapes, but if it's important to you to speak, I will permit you to do so, but I want to admonish you that there is a reason why defendants speak through their counsel and are advised to do so, and it's that each time you put something out there, you're creating a potential harm to yourself that something regrettable or untoward is said, maybe it becomes a building block, or an admission, or something unhelpful to your case. One of the reasons why it's best to have a spokesperson in court is precisely to avoid your accidentally stepping on a landmine.

THE DEFENDANT: So --

THE COURT: If you must, I'll let you speak briefly, but I'm advising you I'm trying to caution you not to do this.

THE DEFENDANT: Well, I feel that I'm being deprived of a fair trial, number one. So that -- and I wrote that to the senators as well.

The issue is, I was deprived of all due -- procedural due process that is guaranteed by U.S.-Salerno and the Bail Reform Act, and I keep on saying the last line of the bail act, and even in the decision of the Supreme Court in U.S. Salerno - I don't know the numbers off the top of my head, it's in my

briefs — that up until trial, there could be evidence resubmitted. So I was deprived five months of liberty, which is a crime. The three people that were there was

Ms. Bensing — sorry, not Ms. Bensing — Ms. Brady, Judge

Scanlon, if I'm saying it right, and Ms. Olivera. They deprived me of testifying. That is a crime, and you were the head of the Southern District DOJ Criminal Division.

THE COURT: No, first of all -- Mr. Celli, first of all, no, I was not -- that was not a job I ever held, but, more to the point, I'm really trying to keep us focused. There are a number of discrete issues here.

THE DEFENDANT: Well, the recordings have occurred. I was deprived of liberty. So there's the issue.

THE COURT: Mr. Celli, I need to instruct you not to interrupt.

THE DEFENDANT: I apologize.

THE COURT: I appreciate your views about the deprivation of your liberty during your pretrial custody, but the trial is not about that. It simply is not. That's not an issue at trial. Whether the decision to deny you release on conditions of bail was right or wrong, procedurally proper or not, is simply not the issue at trial. The issue at trial — and the jury will not be hearing about any of that because it has nothing to do with whether or not you are guilty or not guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. And right now, I'm trying to

raise a series of discrete issues to make sure that I'm resolving them properly, in order to assure you a fair trial. That's the whole point. The reason why a judge zeros in on discrete issues, like I'm trying to do, is to make sure that both sides get a fair trial. So where you could be most helpful to yourself is by being responsive to me when I raise specific issues, and the specific issue that I'm trying to put on the table is this: There are a couple of excerpts of phone calls of yours that the government will be offering into evidence, and I raised the issue of is there a concern that the jury will draw a negative conclusion about you from the fact that you were —

THE DEFENDANT: And --

THE COURT: -- in custody. Mr. Silverman, I think, has the most subtle analysis of how to deal with the problem, and probably the right answer. I wanted to give each side an opportunity to comment. If there's something that -- when I saw your hand going up, I assumed you wanted to contribute to that issue. If you're going to be weighing in on some other issue, like the justness of the denial of bail, I have to tell you, this is not the forum for that. We are now preparing for trial, and I'm trying to identify issues that will affect the conduct of the trial.

THE DEFENDANT: But I've been trying to bring up issues for two years now, and each -- and Judge Scanlon ignored

it, and she threatened me, so now I have to put in a misconduct because -- as for her, Ms. Scanlon, and Ms. Brady and Ms. Bensing, I wrote to the senate judiciary because what they've done to me is a crime, and they've been disciplined.

So, like, no one's hearing me. Like I have been denied a fair

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Celli, Mr. Celli, you're at liberty to write people about your grievances — it's a free country — but in the context of this conference, I am here to deal with discrete issues —

THE DEFENDANT: And --

trial.

THE COURT: One second.

-- of the trial that will occur, and I'm very solicitous of everybody's opinion on the issues that I am raising. But grievances that you have about other people, and including about your pretrial denial of bail, are not being litigated. The jury will not be deciding whether it was or it wasn't right to deny you bail. That's not what the case is about. The issue in the case will be whether or not the government has proven the elements of the threat offense under Section 875(c) beyond a reasonable doubt. And in order to assure you a fair trial, I need to make sure that my rulings as to pieces of evidence are fair and consistent with the rulings of evidence, and that's the spirit of the question I was raising.

THE DEFENDANT: So my subjective intent is that Randi Weingarten, through Senator Schumer -- wait, no, because this is what you are withholding, because I emailed Senator Schumer on 12/11/17, and I have many auto responses from him. So this is --

THE COURT: Mr. Celli --

THE DEFENDANT: Wait. I emailed the ethics committee on this. I asked the senate judicial to send — because you told me I was stupid and crazy to suggest that Senator Schumer had anything to do with your judgeship. And I keep on telling my attorney about Judge Porteous. Judge Porteous was convicted, and Senator Schumer is one of the 88 senators who because — sorry, Porteous lied about association. You lied about your association with Schumer. On the record, it's incumbent upon you, not me, to protect the integrity of your office.

Now, there's a press release from Senator Schumer —

THE COURT: Mr. Celli, I'm going to cut you off. The record of the conference at which you raised some question about Senator Schumer speaks for itself. I'm quite sure I did not deny that Senator Schumer had recommended me for the job I hold, I sit. That's a matter of public record. The broader point, though, Mr. Celli, is we need to keep focused about the —

THE DEFENDANT: And I have been denied by Senator

Schumer because of Randi Weingarten.

THE COURT: Okay.

THE DEFENDANT: And everything stems from there.

THE COURT: Well, all right. Maybe that's a good prompt for me, then, to resolve the motions in limine, because some of them will address the extent to which some of the background that you're referring to has a proper place at this trial.

Mr. Silverman, you looked as if you wanted to speak.

MR. SILVERMAN: That's a great proposal. Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

So what I'm going to do now is I'm going to turn to the motions in limine that are pending. For the record, I'm handing a copy of the resolution that I would be reading aloud to the court reporter. By way of background, though, the Court has received various motions in limine from the government and from the defendant, Lucio Celli. I'm going to resolve these motions, to the extent I can, from the bench today. I will not be issuing a written decision. Instead, I will simply issue an order reflecting the fact that the motions were resolved, for the reasons set forth on the record of today's conference. So, if the content of what I say is important to you, you will need to order the transcript of this proceeding.

The first motion involves Celli's postarrest

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These were made in an interview conducted by two statements. marshals on November 14, 2018, that is recorded on video. interview lasts about 20 minutes and takes place in what appears to be a cellblock. The motion here is by the government. The government states that it intends to offer excerpts of Celli's postarrest statement, but that it does not intend to offer these in their entirety. And I'm citing here Docket 100, the government's memorandum, at pages 4 to 5. government moves to preclude as hearsay certain statements that Celli made in the course of the interview. Accordingly, the government moves to preclude Celli from introducing any of his own statements, such that the portion of the postarrest statement that would be heard by the jury would be limited to the excerpts highlighted in yellow in Exhibit A to the government's letter.

Celli, for his part, does not object to the receipt of the portions of the postarrest statements identified by the government. And for good reason. The statements of Celli's to the marshals that the government has designated are relevant and probative to the issues at hand, and to the extent they contain representations by Celli that the government wishes to offer for the truth of the matters asserted, they are not barred by Federal Rules regarding hearsay. That is because they are statements by a party opponent, and, as such, under Rule 801(d)(2)(A), they fall outside the definition of hearsay,

if offered by the government. In contrast, if offered by Celli for the truth of the matter asserted, these statements by Celli would be hearsay. However, Celli argues that under Federal Rule of Evidence 106, the rule of completeness, the entirety of Celli's postarrest interview, or at least certain of his statements that the government has not highlighted, should be received. These statements, Celli argues, are necessary context for his exchanges with the marshals that the government plans to offer. I've cited here Docket 105, Mr. Celli's opposition, at pages 2 through 4.

Rule 106 provides that where one party introduces a portion of a document or recorded statement, "an adverse party may require the introduction, at that time, of any other part — or any other writing or recorded statement — that in fairness ought to be considered at the same time." As the Second Circuit has explained, the omitted portions of the document or statement "must be placed in evidence if necessary to explain the admitted portion, to place the admitted portion in context, to avoid misleading the jury, or to ensure fair and impartial understanding of the admitted portion." Citing United States v. Johnson, 507 F.3d 793, 769 (2d Cir. 2007).

However, the circuit has stated: "The completeness doctrine does not, however, require the admission of portions of a statement that are neither explanatory of, nor relevant to, the admitted passages."

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To the extent that Celli suggests in a sentence that the entirety of his postarrest statement must be received as context under Rule 106, that is not persuasive. The interview covers a variety of topics. It has at various points a rambling quality. It covers topics including details of Celli's civil lawsuits, and personal traumas that Celli has experienced, and Celli's views on various persons and matters that are irrelevant in this criminal case. The vast majority of the nonhighlighted portions would not shed any light or provide any useful context for the discrete portions that the government has highlighted. The highlighted portions cover no more than about 25 percent of the interview. And, in general, Celli's postarrest statements cannot be properly received for a nonhearsay purpose, such as to illuminate Celli's state of That is because his state of mind after his arrest, mind. which came after the communication of the alleged threatening emails in this case, is not relevant to the charges at issue. The Court therefore rejects Celli's broadly put argument that all nonhighlighted portions of his postarrest statement are admissible under Rule 106. And I should add that many of those portions would be prejudicial to Celli. They include portions in which he becomes excitable and in which he makes accusations or statements that the jury may regard as unreliable, unflattering to Celli, or worse.

Celli, however, makes a more substantial, and more

targeted, argument under Rule 106 as to two specific excerpts of his postarrest statement. I'm citing now Celli's opposition at 2 through 4.

The first excerpt appears on page 8 and covers
lines 13 through 24. It comes immediately after Celli has been
asked about the emails, and what he wrote in them, and to whom
he wrote them. Celli responds to those questions. Those
exchanges, the government plans to offer, without objection.
But the government proposes not to offer the following
question, beginning on line 13, in which the marshal probes
Celli's state of mind in writing what he wrote, and to which
Celli responds, beginning on line 17. And I am quoting now the
first disputed excerpt.

"Marshal: So what do you, I understand you're upset and, um, when you stated in your email about stabbing them?

"Celli: I don't mean to actually do it because I'm not a violent person. I want justice. Like, I don't think I should have had to -- I've emailed many times without threatening, and I think I submitted the right way the judicial complaint, and then the New York City Mental Health came to me..."

And I'm citing again the postarrest statement at page 8.

The portion of Celli's response that I have quoted ends on line 24. I should add that Celli's response goes on to

line 28 and covers another long sentence and a short one, in which Celli makes statements that appear to refer to an unrelated report he made to the New York City police regarding a white person and how the police responded by showing him, in some fashion, it appears, pictures of African Americans. As to these lines, 24 through 28, Celli does not argue that these are necessary to receive in the interests of completeness. I confirmed that with Mr. Silverman a few moments ago, and I agree with that. That one— to two—sentence detour between lines 24 and 28 is extraneous and irrelevant.

Critically, immediately afterwards in the interview, beginning at line 30, comes another exchange that the government highlights for inclusion. In it, the marshal, referencing what Celli had just said, asks the following leading question:

"So, you were aware that the emails you sent out were threatening?"

And Celli responds, beginning at line 33, "Cause I feel threatened as well because I don't know how to get justice anymore, because if it's okay to threaten me, it's okay to threaten back. Because they're not above the law. That's how I feel."

The marshal then responds with this query: "And when you say them?"

Celli responds: "The federal judges."

That brief exchange is the last part of that section that the government highlights.

Celli argues that the inclusion of this exchange is necessary context for the exchange that follows, in which Celli explains that he felt threatened. The government argues that it must be excluded as hearsay.

I am persuaded by Mr. Silverman's argument on this point. As he convincingly argues, the excerpt between lines 13 and 24 provides necessary context for the exchange that follows, within the meaning of Rule 106. Without it, the marshals' question about whether Celli was aware that the emails he sent were threatening provides an incomplete portrait of Celli's state of mind at the time he sent the emails as Celli was reporting it. In effect, the marshals' question zeroed in on one part of Celli's previous answer relating to his awareness of the threatening quality of the emails, and the marshals' question prompted Celli to elaborate on that point. But if the previous answer, between lines 13 and 24, is not included, it risks the jury considering Celli's ensuing answers in incomplete context.

And that risk is particularly acute because the marshal begins his question, at line 29, with the word "so."

He states, "So, you were aware that the emails you sent out were threatening?" The word "so" is a cue. It's a cue to the listener that the marshal was picking up on something that

Celli had just said. If the jury does not hear the previous exchange, however, there is considerable risk that they will speculate about what it was that Celli had said that led to the marshal, in harkening back to Celli's immediately prior statement, to attribute to Celli an awareness that his emails had been threatening. Fairness to Celli requires that the jury know what the marshal was referring to when he concluded, and asked Celli to confirm, that Celli had been aware that the emails were threatening. So, I will admit lines 13 to 24 under Rule 106, in fairness to Celli.

I do this to assure that the jury can understand the ensuing exchange in the proper context, and so, government, when you offer the interview excerpts, you must include the lines 13 through 24 if you intend to offer the lines that immediately follow, as I expect you will continue to plan to do.

Now, Celli separately argues that an excerpt at page 10, lines 22 to 32, also be received. This exchange occurs a little later in the interview. At this point in the interview, the marshals have asked Celli about various emails he sent. Celli reads aloud from one. He then stops reading. That is where the government's highlighted excerpt ceases. Celli then states that certain documents were missing from the Court, apparently a reference to one of his civil cases, and then comes the following exchange, which Celli asks be received

and put before the jury. I'm quoting now again from lines 21 to 32:

"Celli: I have the -- excuse me, I don't want to come off as threatening. I apologize.

"Marshal: That's okay.

"Celli: No, because I know, I -- I apologize.

"Marshal: That's all right. You're a person that talks with his hands. I know what you mean. You're fine. You're fine, you're fine."

Celli argues that this exchange is admissible for two reasons under Rule 106 and as evidence of his state of mind.

The Court is unpersuaded. Viewing the exchange alongside the video, it is clear that this exchange was prompted by Celli's having suddenly become very animated. He waves his arms around while holding papers, apparently the emails the marshals had been asking him about. And he either brushes or comes close to brushing against the marshal's leg in the confined space of the cellblock. That is the clear context of these remarks. Celli is essentially apologizing for either coming close to or invading the marshal's space, and/or for the volume of his remarks. But this excerpt, unlike the earlier one on page 8, does not shed any light on any succeeding or preceding remarks. Rule 106 does not require the admission of this excerpt. It is an apology for a brief event, the brush of the papers and/or the raising of the voice, that began after

the excerpt that the government intends to offer ended.

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To the extent that Celli separately argues that the exchange is probative of how the marshals interact with and perceive Celli's behavior, that is not a proper basis for admission either. Celli at this moment was gracious in apologizing for his gesticulations and outburst. And the marshals graciously acknowledged that Celli, in speaking with his hands, did not mean to be threatening. But the marshals' perceptions of his postarrest behavior are irrelevant to any issue to be tried. Their assessments, which the transcript and video suggests were to the effect that Celli had not meant anything threatening by his immediately preceding gestures and loud words, do not speak to Celli's mens rea or state of mind at the time he took the actions at issue in this case - the preparation and sending of the emails to judges that the government alleges were actual threats. In any event, even if Celli's civil behavior at this brief moment with the marshals is some way regarded as probative of his broader capacity to be civil, it would be significantly outweighed by the capacity of this episode to confuse. That is because Celli's interest in offering this is precisely to achieve a forbidden inference, to wit, that the marshals had concluded that Celli more generally was not a person capable of making actual threats or inclined to make actual threats. That inference does not follow from this excerpt. And even if it did, the marshals are

not expert witnesses on human psychology and character. I would thus exclude this excerpt under Rule 403, if it were not independently inadmissible under Rule 401 and 402 as irrelevant. It is confusing and potentially prejudicial.

Now, there is a final separate issue as to the postarrest statement. Celli argues that with respect to his interview by the marshals, the Court should permit the jury to hear the audio, but not see the video. Citing here Celli's opposition at 4 to 5. That is because Celli is handcuffed in the video. Celli expresses concern that the presence of the handcuffs and Celli's presence in a cellblock may be taken to suggest that the marshals were too afraid to interview him unrestrained.

Separately, Celli notes that insofar as the parties and counsel will wear masks during the trial, these images of him may be the only ones of him without a mask on that jurors are able to see. This, too, Celli argues, favors exclusion of the video.

The Court has carefully reviewed the postarrest interview. The Court has listened to it accompanied and not accompanied by the video footage. The Court's inquiry as to whether to permit the video to play is under Rule 403, which, again, permits the Court to exclude "relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of," among other factors, "unfair prejudice."

Here, as to the handcuffs, Celli relies on United States v. Hurtado, 47 F.3d 577 (2d Cir. 1995). There, the Second Circuit held that a defendant should not be compelled to attend trial in prison or jail clothing due to the possible impact on the defendant's presumption of innocence and due process right to a fair trial. Id. at 581. The Supreme Court has similarly recognized that a defendant's wearing of prison clothes or use of physical restraints in the courtroom can adversely affect how jurors feel about him. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 505 (1976). For this reason, of course, as counsel are familiar, efforts are made as to defendants who are in custody to assure that they are in street or civilian clothing during trial and that they are not visibly restrained in the presence of the jury.

Celli is not in that situation. He is not incarcerated, and so at trial, he will be in civilian clothing and not restrained. Under these circumstances, the negative inference that may arise from a defendant's being shackled in court will not arise. The handcuffing of a defendant in a cellblock immediately following an arrest, by its nature, is not likely to give rise among jurors to any fear of the defendant, where the defendant is visibly unrestrained and at liberty in court. And the body language of the marshals during the interview, as reflected on the video, does not bespeak any physical concern about Celli. Moreover, counsel are at liberty

to establish, as I expect from my colloquy with government counsel is correct, through questioning of the marshals or perhaps through a stipulation, that the interview occurred shortly after Celli's arrest and that it is normal procedure to handcuff a person interviewed in the cellblock following his arrest.

Under Rule 403, I therefore find a very limited prejudice, if any, to the defendant from showing the video.

I also do not find meaningful prejudice from the fact that Celli's full face appears in the video. It is, of course, unfortunate that as a result of public health precautions, Celli and the other personnel at trial will generally be masked. That said, the jury will get a view of Celli's full face at some points, including during jury selection, but that does not mean there is anything prejudicial about the jury's viewing Celli's face during the interview. There is nothing inherently prejudicial about his face or the expressions he makes during the interview.

On the flip side, having listened to the audio with and without the video, it is palpably easier to follow by video. It is clear who is speaking and what is being said, and it is clear when the defendant is reading from a document as opposed to responding to a question. The video promotes clarity and eliminates confusion. I therefore find that the probative value of the video, far from being substantially

outweighed by countervailing factors such as unfair prejudice or confusion, significantly outweighs those factors. So I will permit the government to play the video when it plays the excerpts at trial.

Switching gears:

The government next moves in limine to offer excerpts of two calls that the defendant had while in prison, a call on November 22, 2018, and a call on December 3, 2018. Celli does not object to these excerpts being received, nor does he argue that other excerpts must be received under Rule 106. The Court will therefore permit these excerpts to be received at trial.

Now, a few moments ago, I had a colloquy with counsel about a collateral issue involving the fact that these interviews took place in prison. I am eager to, as best as possible, minimize any possible prejudice to Mr. Celli from the fact that these calls took place in prison, and I solicited letters from counsel on that point. Offhand, Mr. Silverman's insight appears to be the most perceptive as to the best way to minimize the prejudice, but I will be eager with everyone having an opportunity to reflect on the right way to handle this, to get your thought-out views.

Next, the government moves for permission to offer certain of Celli's email communications before the date of the threats at issue, and his interactions with the marshals prior to the date of the alleged threats, as either direct evidence

or under Rule of Evidence 404(b). Celli moves to the same effect. He would like his prior communications with the marshals to be received as circumstantial evidence of his state of mind in connection with the later threats. He would also like these communications received as evidence of whether an objective person would consider the November 12, 2018 emails threatening. Celli does not oppose the government's motion to introduce either the emails or interactions with the marshals. However, the government opposes Celli's introduction of evidence regarding his prior interactions with the marshals insofar as Celli seeks to offer various unspecified statements, which the government calls false exculpatory statements and self-serving, for the truth of the matter asserted.

The government has filed under seal a number of documents reflecting Celli's prearrest interactions with the marshals and a sample of his prearrest emails. Based on the documents before the Court at this point, the Court is constrained to agree with Mr. Silverman's apt observation that there is, as yet, no live dispute here. Both parties agree that at least some of Celli's Pre-November 12th emails are admissible, and that the course of dealing between Celli and the marshals who confronted him about these emails is, in general, properly admitted. And that is clearly correct. The government is correct, in general, that Celli's emails and confrontations with the marshals preceding his alleged threats

to the judges in November are admissible as background to the events at issue, both under Rule 402 and Rule 404(b). The government's narrative appears to be that Celli became progressively more enraged and retributive over time. The government's narrative is further that the marshals' visits to him, for which he blamed the judges in the civil cases for bringing these about, are among the reasons that Celli's emails escalated in tone to the point that in November, they became actual threats. These dealings are clearly probative for that purpose. And no party has identified, as yet, any countervailing aspect of these emails or communications that require their exclusion, although it may be that discrete lines or words require redaction in the interest of avoiding unfair prejudice, particularly to Celli.

From Celli's perspective, he is entitled, too, to develop this course of dealing, and that is so for two reasons: First, Celli may try to draw on these to rebut the government's theory that his earlier dealing with the marshals provoked him to greater outrage and more serious threats; and, second, Celli may draw on these to argue that his subjective state of mind and intent was influenced by these dealings.

There does not appear to be a dispute as to these points. The government's opposition, such as it is, rests on an apparent misconception of Celli's argument. The Court does not understand either Celli or the government to be offering

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statements made during Celli's prior interactions with the marshals for the truth of the matters asserted therein. government purports to offer these statements to "provide necessary background and context to the charged offense." Citing the government's memo at 6. And Celli explains that he intends to offer these statements as evidence of his state of mind and Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3) provides a hearsay exception for just this purpose. It permits a party to introduce out-of-court statements reflecting "the declarant's then existing state of mind (such as motive, intent, or plan) or emotional, sensory, or physical condition (such as mental feeling, pain, or bodily health...)." Celli's statements made during his Pre-November 14 interactions with the marshals are probative of his state of mind at the time he sent the earlier emails, for which he was not indicted. To be sure, as the government notes, Celli has not been charged in the indictment in connection with these emails, but, as the government argues, in the point that favors the inclusion of this evidence for both parties' use, the earlier emails and interactions with the marshals are "inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense." Citing the government's memo at 6. Celli may therefore offer, in general, his statements in his pre-November 14 dealings with the marshals as evidence not for the truth of the matter asserted, but of his state of mind.

To the extent that there are statements by Celli

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during the pre-November 14 period that the government is concerned would be improperly considered for the truth of the matters asserted, the government has yet to specifically identify any of these to the Court. The Court therefore has no occasion to rule at this point whether discrete such statements could be admitted only subject to a limiting instruction or perhaps could not be admitted at all.

Importantly, in holding that Celli's Pre-November 14 interactions with the marshals are generally admissible as to Celli's state of mind, the Court is not authorizing Celli to rely on evidence of these interactions as evidence as to whether an objective observer would consider Celli's earlier emails to be threatening. The marshals cannot stand in for an objective person. Their decisions how to respond in the moment to Celli, or whether to arrest Celli based on those threats, emails, or communications, may reflect a host of These include the marshals' decisions as to considerations. how to allocate their times and resources and the direction, if any, they had been given as to how to respond to Celli. may also include the marshals' assessment of Celli's mental The Court will not permit argument that because the marshals did not arrest Celli, or take other action prior to November 12th, an objective observer would not regard Celli's Pre-November 14 emails as being not threats. communications, in other words, may be considered to the extent

they bear on Celli's state of mind, but they may not be considered as bearing on how an objective observer would view Celli's statements.

Turning now to Celli's civil suit. The parties have also submitted motions in limine as to the extent to which Celli and the government can offer evidence as to the prior civil lawsuits in which Celli participated before Judge Brodie and Judge Cogan during the years 2015 to 2018. Celli has filed a related pro se letter related to this point. See Docket 123. The fact and broad nature of these lawsuits, and Celli's posture in them, and the status of the lawsuits at the time of the alleged threats are all properly being put before the jury. So, too, are the developments in the lawsuits that are alleged to have provoked Celli to begin and continue his emails to the judges and others.

However, the details of the two civil lawsuits, and any other civil lawsuits to which Celli was a party or participant, are largely irrelevant to the current case. The prosecution is not about those lawsuits. It is not about who was right or wrong in them. That is because threats are not defensible on the ground that they were made to avenge erroneous rulings or unfortunate developments. Evidence beyond more than necessary to give brief background and context about Celli's civil lawsuits would not add probative value. On the contrary, it would potentially distract the jury, misleading

the jury to believe that the merit of those lawsuits were at issue, and it is not. And it would potentially waste time, potentially a lot. Such evidence is thus clearly properly excluded under Rule 403.

To assure that there is clarity as to what is permitted, the Court directs the parties to confer as to the evidence to be offered about the civil lawsuits. The Court further directs the parties to present to the Court, by two weeks before the start of trial — that is May 3rd — with letters setting out their respective views as to the evidence relating to the civil lawsuits that each would seek to offer at trial. While the Court's statements today should give counsel ample guidance, these submissions will enable the Court to resolve any concrete disputes that may linger as to the limited information about the civil suits that may be properly elicited at trial as context for the alleged threats that followed.

All right. Switching gears: The government next moves "to preclude the defendant from presenting evidence or making arguments referencing any First Amendment right to have sent the November 12, 2018 emails because no such right exists." Quoting the government's memo at 9. The defense acknowledges that the First Amendment does not give citizens a right to make threats such as to kill a federal judge. Citing Celli's opposition at 6, referring to the "nonexistent First Amendment right to threaten." And, thus, there does not appear

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to be a live dispute as to this issue. It appears to be common ground that the First Amendment is not a fit subject for counsel to comment on before the jury. Nevertheless, for the sake of assuring that there is no confusion on this point, the Court will address the issue.

The only role that the First Amendment plays in cases under 18, U.S.C., Section 875(c) is insofar as it informs the lawful reach of the statute. The First Amendment allows statements that are "true threats" to be prohibited and criminally prosecuted, including under Section 875. As the Second Circuit has put the point, "Prohibitions on true threats - even where the speaker has no intention of carrying them out -...are fully consistent with the First Amendment." I'm citing United States v. Turner, 720 F.3d 411, 420 (2d Cir. 2013). Whether the evidence permits a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that a particular statement is a true threat and therefore outside the protection of the First Amendment is a legal determination for the Court. The Court will make that determination at the close of the evidence, assuming that a motion to this effect is made by the defense under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29. The application of the First Amendment is not a subject for counsel to take up before the The Second Circuit has squarely so held, and I quote: "The question of the application of the First Amendment to the statute here is properly for the Court rather than the jury."

United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1028 (2d Cir. 1976).

Counsel's roles are instead in guiding the Court as to the proper jury instruction and then in arguing before the jury whether the evidence establishes the elements of the offense of Section 875(c) as charged. It's premature for the Court to anticipate the particular instruction it will give. However, Judge Sand's treatise offers, as usual, a useful overview of the elements of this offense. I'm citing Leonard Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions (2016 ed.). Instruction 31-7 in that venerable treatise lists the following as the three elements of Section 875(c) that the jury, to convict, must find beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that "the defendant threatened to kidnap or to injure [the victims]"; (2) that "the threat was transmitted in interstate or foreign commerce"; and (3) that "the defendant transmitted the threat knowingly and intentionally."

Celli argues that he (1) "should be permitted to argue to the jury that Mr. Celli cannot be convicted merely because his statements are crude and inflammatory"; (2) "that knowledge that statements are offensive or startling does not equal intent to threaten"; and (3) "that the jury can use its common sense and everyday experiences to infer that a citizen like Mr. Celli would believe that he has every right to say offensive things." I'm citing Celli's opposition at 6. As to the first two of these points, these concepts, to the extent

they capture propositions of law, are in the proper province of the Court's instructions to the jury. These instructions, however they are ultimately put, will make clear that the fact that a statement is crude, or inflammatory, or offensive, or startling alone does not make it a threat. The model Sand instruction, instruction 31-7, says essentially this, and I quote: "A threat is a serious statement as distinguished from idle or careless talk, exaggeration, or something said in a joking manner. For a statement to be a threat, the statement must have been made under such circumstances, that a reasonable person who heard or read the statement would understand it as a serious expression of an intent to inflict bodily injury (or murder or kidnap)." It will be for counsel to argue the point of whether the facts satisfy that standard.

And as to the third point being made by Mr. Celli, as the Court will instruct the jury, the jury may use its common sense and everyday experience in finding the facts. And counsel on both sides will surely invoke common sense and experience in arguing whether the elements have been established. But it's not for counsel to argue, whether based on common sense or otherwise, what the law is. That is the province of the Court. The Court expects to instruct the jury, broadly consistent with the model instructions of the Sand treatise, that the government must prove that the defendant "made the statement intending it to be a threat or with the

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knowledge that the statement would be viewed as a threat." The Court expects to further instruct the jury, in substance - I'm quoting Sand again - "The government must prove that the defendant intended the communication be received by [the victim] as a threat. The government is not required to prove that the defendant intended to carry out the threat." These instructions will fully safeguard the defendant's right not to be convicted based on protected speech that falls short of being a true threat. Counsel may also argue, and the Court expects that counsel on both sides will, that the jury can consult its common sense in determining whether the evidence has established these elements. But to be clear, it's for the Court, not counsel, to instruct the jury as to the law. So, if anything is to be said to the jury about the relationship between the First Amendment and the statute, it is for the Court to do so, not counsel.

One final point: There is no constitutional right to make threats that fall within the scope of the statute as defined by its elements. And it does not appear that the defense is planning to argue otherwise or that Celli thought that there was such a right. The defense, it appears, will be, in whole or in part, that the statements should not be found as threats or that Celli did not have the requisite intent to threat. For avoidance of doubt, however, the defense will not be permitted to make an argument sounding in nullification,

to wit, that the statute should not be enforced, for example, because it offends a juror's view of what the Constitution should protect. Counsel will be at liberty at the close of the evidence to argue to the Court that the evidence, as a matter of law, is insufficient, and if that argument fails, counsel will be at liberty to argue to the jury that the evidence does not establish the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Counsel may not, however, argue that if the elements are established beyond a reasonable doubt, the statute should not nevertheless be enforced.

Final point: Celli moves to redact any offensive or sexist remarks in any emails of his that the government offers at trial. See Celli memo at 17. Celli argues that certain offensive remarks of his are likely to inflame the jury and should be excluded under Rule 403. However, the government has indicated that it intends to confer with defense counsel regarding exhibits, so as to moot the need for the Court's intervention in this matter. Accordingly, the Court declines to rule on this motion at this time. The Court is confident that counsel, working together, can agree upon appropriate redactions.

That ends the motions in limine.

Let me just check with our court reporter, before we move to the next segment, whether you would like a comfort break?

(Discussion off the record)

THE COURT: Why don't we do this: It's 3:17. I'll see you at 3:25, and at that time, we'll pivot to the *Faretta* portion of the conference. Thank you.

(Recess)

THE COURT: Welcome back, everyone. Back on the record.

I now want to pivot to the request that was made in Mr. Silverman's letter of March 29th in which he states that Mr. Celli informs him — informs Mr. Silverman — that he, Mr. Celli, wishes to represent himself at the coming trial.

I have removed from the equation the concern that Mr. Silverman might be a fact witness. Even with that removed, Mr. Silverman, I take it Mr. Celli is still interested in exploring representing himself at trial?

MR. SILVERMAN: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Then given that, Mr. Celli, as I'm sure Mr. Silverman has explained, there is a process by which a judge has to engage, in effect, have an extended conversation with the defendant because that's an extremely serious and fraught decision, and there is case law from the Supreme Court that structures the conversation I am to have with you, so that, at the end of the day, I can determine whether to approve a request like that, and many of them are not approved and some are, but it ultimately turns on the

responses that I receive and my assessment after that. So what I'm going to have happen is Mr. Smallman is going to place you under oath, and I will confirm that you understand what it means to be under oath, and then I will put a series of questions to you which you will be obliged to answer under oath.

THE DEFENDANT: Sure.

THE COURT: Before we begin, Mr. Silverman, I take it, you have reviewed with Mr. Celli the nature of the questions that a court tends to put to a defendant who seeks to represent himself?

MR. SILVERMAN: I have, your Honor. And just to preview two quick points: One, Mr. Celli will explain this during his allocution. When asked if this is knowing and voluntary, which is a critical part of the inquiry, his answer will be: It's not what he wants; he wishes he had a lawyer who would defend him in a way that he thinks is appropriate, and that that would be his preference. He understands that your Honor said that there would not be another substitution for the reasons that have previously been stated, and he, therefore, wishes to represent himself. And so far as voluntariness means coercion, threats, or that kind of duress, Mr. Celli will allocute on his own, but I just want to preview that point.

And your Honor has, no doubt, reviewed the government's proposed *Faretta* questions, and your Honor has

your own questions, I'm sure, but I just want to note two quick things on the government's questions, if it's okay with the Court.

THE COURT: Sure. I have my own questions, but I'd be happy to get your perspective on the government's.

MR. SILVERMAN: I appreciate that. Thank you.

On their question 16, I would respectfully --

THE COURT: Read that one aloud. I've got my own.

MR. SILVERMAN: Question 16 is: "Do you understand that once you make this decision, it is not a situation where you can change your mind, for example, after the trial begins, and go back and forth, and say that you need a lawyer for this or that, even if I appoint you standby counsel, that counsel will serve only as your legal advisor and is unlikely to be in a position to take over for you at trial? Do you understand that?" That's the government's letter, Docket 130, at page 3, question number 16.

And I would — just with respect to that one question,
I would respectfully offer that that language is a bit strong.

Faretta itself came up with the term "standby counsel." It
contemplates standby counsel. I agree that it is something to
advise that going back and forth is not practical, like a
see—saw, but I believe Mr. Celli will tell the Court that there
may be things he's amenable to assistance from counsel for,
including the questioning of some witnesses and including

ongoing negotiations with the government about a resolution. If he's amenable to that kind of assistance, or if he decides that he's amenable to that kind of assistance, I would respectfully request that the Court exercise its discretion to allow him to receive it. I appreciate that that's within the Court's discretion.

And as a final point, the government notes in its point 9 that it calculates the guidelines after trial at 33 to 41 months, and I would only note that when reviewing this with Mr. Celli, and as I say now, that's the government's calculation of the guidelines, and I would just respectfully request that the Court not adopt them formally, as it's clearly not the right time.

THE COURT: I did not have any intention of quoting any guideline range. May I ask you whether that calculation would credit Mr. Celli for acceptance of responsibility if there was a disposition?

MR. SILVERMAN: That calculation, as I understand the government's calculation, would not credit it, so it would be lower on a disposition. And, of course, it doesn't -- it applies enhancements that we would litigate if it got to that point.

THE COURT: Do you know what the government's calculation would be if Mr. Celli accepted responsibility?

MR. SILVERMAN: Yes, your Honor. And, in fact, I just

flag, in case your Honor wants to allocute Mr. Celli on whether 1 there's ever been a plea offer at any point in this case. 2 3 don't know if this is the time the Court --4 THE COURT: I usually do that closer to trial, but it may well be worth doing now. But keep going. 5 6 MR. SILVERMAN: Mr. Celli is prepared to allocute on 7 that, and the government did, in 2019, when Mr. Celli was represented by the Federal Defenders, provide a plea offer that 8 9 contained a guidelines of 24 to 30 months on a plea. 10 THE COURT: Is that what you would get if you 11 subtracted three points from the government's 33 to 41? 12 MR. SILVERMAN: Yes, your Honor. 13 THE COURT: All right. 14 MS. KARMIGIOS: Your Honor, I'm sorry, I believe 15 that's the two points, but the third point would be 24 to 30 I may have misheard what he said. 16 17 THE COURT: Sorry. I think my question to 18 Mr. Silverman was if you subtracted three points from the 19 offense level that yielded 33 to 41, would you get 24 to 30. 20 MS. KARMIGIOS: Yes. Sorry, your Honor, I 21 misunderstood. 22 THE COURT: He said yes. 23 MS. KARMIGIOS: Yes, that's correct. 24 THE COURT: All right. 25 Let's take up a couple of those preliminaries first,

and then we'll move on here. I think it would be informative 1 2 just to understand whether there has been a plea offer in the 3 case. Government, are you prepared to proffer as to any plea offer that has been extended? 4 5 MS. KARMIGIOS: Yes, your Honor. It was before my time, but I've spoken to my predecessor, and I do have 6 7 information about that plea offer. 8 THE COURT: Please just put it on the record. 9 MS. KARMIGIOS: It was in October -- sorry, your 10 Honor. Just one moment. 11 (Counsel confer) 12 MS. KARMIGIOS: My apologies, your Honor. 13 confirming the date that it was extended. 14 It was extended in May of 2019, and it was to plead 15 guilty to the sole count of the indictment. Would your Honor 16 like me to go through --17 THE COURT: Just what the terms of the offer would be. 18 MS. KARMIGIOS: Sure. 19 THE COURT: The essential terms. 20 MS. KARMIGIOS: Excuse me? 21 THE COURT: The essential terms. 22 MS. KARMIGIOS: Sure. 23 To plead quilty to the sole count of the indictment, 24 which carries a maximum term of imprisonment of five years, a 25 minimum term of zero years and a supervised release term.

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your Honor.

calculated the base offense level under 2A6.1(a)(1) as 12, we included a two-point enhancement because the offense involved more than two threats, and a six-point enhancement for official victims those were the enhancements that defense counsel has indicated they would litigate, were we to get to that. And, again, we did account for three acceptance points and getting to a range of 24 to 30 months with a criminal history category of I. THE COURT: And that proposed plea offer was a firm written plea offer? MS. KARMIGIOS: Yes, your Honor. THE COURT: I take it the offer essentially benefits Mr. Celli only insofar as it locks the government in to not taking a more aggressive position of the guidelines, but insofar as there's no count being dismissed, Mr. Celli also, at any given time, would have had the right to plead guilty and reserve all his rights as to how the guidelines applied? MS. KARMIGIOS: Yes, your Honor. And also pursuant to the plea agreement, the government would take no position concerning where within the guidelines range the sentence should fall and make no motions for upward departures. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. That's helpful. What was the disposition of that plea offer?

MS. KARMIGIOS: It's my understanding it was rejected,

1 THE COURT: Who was defense counsel at the time, Federal Defenders? 2 3 MS. KARMIGIOS: Yes. I believe it was Michael Weil, 4 of the Federal Defenders. 5 THE COURT: Mr. Silverman, understanding that that 6 came before your time, does that accord with your understanding 7 of the history of plea offers in the case? 8 MR. SILVERMAN: Yes, your Honor. I would just note 9 that I think the May date may be -- Ms. Karmigios, neither she 10 nor I were on the case at the time -- I think that may be the 11 date it expired. It was offered in April. The reason I note 12 that is there was a change of counsel at precisely that time, 13 so I believe Mr. Celli was represented by both Michael Weil, of 14 the Federal Defenders, and Michael Hueston, of the CJA panel, 15 while the offer was open. 16 THE COURT: I see. 17 Ms. Karmigios, has there been any other plea offer 18 extended in this case, to your knowledge? 19 MS. KARMIGIOS: No, there has not, your Honor. 20 THE COURT: Is that consistent with your 21 understanding, Mr. Silverman? 22 MR. SILVERMAN: Yes, your Honor. 23 THE COURT: Mr. Celli, is what has been said correct 24 about the history of plea offers? 25 THE DEFENDANT: No. There was supposedly one more in

July of this year, July of 2020, but Mr. Taylor lies all the 1 time, so I don't know if it's true or not. 2 3 THE COURT: Mr. Taylor? 4 THE DEFENDANT: Mr. Taylor lied all the time, so I 5 don't know if it was true or not. 6 THE COURT: Did you ever see anything in writing? 7 THE DEFENDANT: No. It was just verbal. 8 MR. SILVERMAN: Your Honor --9 THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Silverman. 10 MR. SILVERMAN: If I may, my understanding is that 11 there were discussions when Mr. Taylor represented Mr. Celli 12 prior to my appointment that were informal in nature, and that 13 Mr. Taylor presented Mr. Celli with an informal suggestion that 14 something might be possible, and it was also rejected, but 15 there was never a formal plea offer at that time. 16 THE COURT: It was rejected in the sense that what 17 Mr. Taylor floated to Mr. Celli was rejected, but you are not 18 representing that the government, during Mr. Taylor's 19 representation, made another plea offer; is that correct? 20 MR. SILVERMAN: Correct, your Honor. There was never 21 a formal offer, that I'm aware of, after the one in 2019. 22 THE COURT: So, Mr. Celli, understanding that you

THE COURT: So, Mr. Celli, understanding that you heard what you heard from Mr. Taylor, did you ever see a written -- second written formal offer?

THE DEFENDANT: No.

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THE COURT: All right.

Before we go to the Faretta issue, Mr. Silverman, you were the fourth or fifth lawyer, depending on how we count this, in the case, and I think what you were saying to me is, actually, if Mr. Celli could have a lawyer who better suited his interests and said more of what he wanted the lawyer to say, he might be willing to have a successor to you, it's only because he perceives this Court as putting an end to the sequence of lawyers without very just cause that his choice has become you or self-representation.

MR. SILVERMAN: I think that's fair, your Honor, yes.

THE COURT: May I ask you, Mr. Silverman, and I ask you to answer as an officer of the Court, to comment on the state of the attorney-client relationship? In particular, the question here is: I understand, given the history, Mr. Celli has had a history with lawyers in civil and criminal cases that have not ended well, period, full stop. The question is whether there is something really realistically reparable, such that the problem here is about you and him as opposed to any lawyer and him?

MR. SILVERMAN: Your Honor, I don't think the issue here is a breakdown in communications or an inability to work together. I think the issue is more that Mr. Celli wants to proceed in certain ways that, as an officer of the Court, I am not able to, and that other counsel have expressed this view --

THE COURT: The same view as you?

MR. SILVERMAN: Correct.

-- and under those circumstances, Mr. Celli would like to proceed on his own. But it is not a reflection of a breakdown in communications between Mr. Celli and myself.

THE COURT: It's that there are areas of advocacy that you don't believe you can, consistent with the practice and ethics rules, engage in that he would like you to do, not that there is a loss of respect or communicative ability?

MR. SILVERMAN: Precisely, your Honor.

THE COURT: May I ask you this — and we'll go through the Faretta inquiry, because I am eager to take that up with Mr. Celli — but I wonder if there's a place in this process for an ex parte meeting between counsel and the Court to probe some of that? The reason I say that is that, to the extent that what we're talking about here is defense strategy — Mr. Celli has his visions of defense strategy, you have your views as to what the red lines are here that can't be crossed from an ethics or professional practice or responsible lawyering perspective — the government's not properly privy to that, they should not know what the strategic calls are that the defense team is considering, but that may be important for the Court to hear because I may need to make a determination whether the problem here is, as you describe it, one involving fundamental issues that a lawyer — a responsible lawyer would place on the

advocacy that can be made on Mr. Celli's behalf as opposed to something personal between present counsel and the client. It may also be that an ex parte communication in which I probe these issues has a salutary effect to the extent Mr. Celli is listening —

THE DEFENDANT: I'm listening.

THE COURT: -- in hearing the Court assess whether counsel's perceptions are correct about what lines of advocacy would be out of bounds under the rules of evidence. For example, if you imagine that there is some defense theory that literally is incompatible with the rules of evidence, whatever it would be, and you were to say that to Mr. Celli, he might not be pleased with you for saying that; if I were, upon presentation of it, to find that you are right about that, perhaps that would have a salubrious effect on the relationship because it's not you, it's the umpire saying that that's just not allowed.

MR. SILVERMAN: Everything your Honor said makes perfect sense, and we have absolutely no objection to an ex parte proceeding along the lines of what your Honor just proposed.

THE COURT: All right.

Here's, then, what I would propose to do: Let me go through the *Faretta* inquiry with Mr. Celli - I want him to understanding the implications of the request - but it may well

be after that inquiry, that we schedule a conference, 1 2 presumably for next week, at which we can follow this up after 3 you've had a little time with Mr. Celli because I want to make 4 sure that the way you see things is correct, which is to say, the issue is about the range of motion that any lawyer would 5 6 have relative to the requests that Mr. Celli is making of the 7 lawyer in terms of courtroom ethics. 8 MR. SILVERMAN: Yes, your Honor. 9 THE COURT: I just want to make sure, that's a 10 sensible way to approach? 11 MR. SILVERMAN: Yes, your Honor. 12 THE COURT: Government counsel, what's your view about 13 that, just as a process? 14 MS. KARMIGIOS: No objection from me, your Honor. 15 THE COURT: All right. So let's go through the Faretta inquiry, and we'll see where we go with that. 16 17 Mr. Smallman, would you kindly place Mr. Celli under 18 oath. 19 (Defendant sworn) 20 THE COURT: Mr. Celli, do you understand that you're 21 now under oath, and that that means that any false statement 22 you make may subject you to --23 THE DEFENDANT: Another trial. 24 THE COURT: -- another prosecution for the crime of 25 perjury?

1	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.
2	THE COURT: I'm going to ask you some questions at the
3	beginning that I know the answer to, it's just a matter of
4	making a clear record, so don't treat it as ignorance, and you
5	will see why with the very first question.
6	What is your name?
7	THE DEFENDANT: Lucio Celli.
8	THE COURT: How old are you?
9	THE DEFENDANT: Forty-five.
10	Forty-five.
11	THE COURT: How far did you go in school, Mr. Celli?
12	THE DEFENDANT: I have a Master's degree.
13	THE COURT: What is your Master's in?
14	THE DEFENDANT: Special ed.
15	THE COURT: When did you receive a Master's?
16	THE DEFENDANT: 2002.
17	THE COURT: Where did you get the Master's?
18	THE DEFENDANT: Touro College.
19	THE COURT: Good for you.
20	Did you teach in the public school system?
21	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I did.
22	THE COURT: Good for you. I have great admiration for
23	the teachers in our public school system. I'm the child of
24	one.
25	Are you presently under the care of a psychiatrist or

1	a doctor?
2	THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
3	THE COURT: Without going into great detail, can you
4	describe at a high-level what that just in a few sentences,
5	what the nature of the care is for?
6	THE DEFENDANT: For anxiety and PTSD.
7	THE COURT: How long have you been under that care?
8	THE DEFENDANT: Currently? Since the current
9	doctor, since January.
10	THE COURT: And prior to that doctor, had there been
11	other doctors?
12	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, other doctors.
13	THE COURT: Let me just finish the question, just so
14	it's clear on the record what I'm asking.
15	Prior to that doctor, had you been treated by other
16	doctors for the same or similar conditions?
17	THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
18	THE COURT: How long did that go back?
19	THE DEFENDANT: On and off for about ten years.
20	THE COURT: Are you on any medication for any of those
21	conditions?
22	THE DEFENDANT: Mostly Klonopin. I take it for
23	Lorazepam, whatever it's called. Lamictal. I was taken off of
24	Buspar because I was on it for a while. And there's one more,
25	I don't remember the name.

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               THE COURT: Do those medications affect your ability
 2
      to think clearly?
 3
               THE DEFENDANT: No.
 4
               THE COURT: Is your mind clear today?
 5
               THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
 6
               THE COURT: Other than what we've just discussed, have
 7
      you received any medical care for any mental illness?
               THE DEFENDANT: Just what I described.
 8
9
               THE COURT: Nothing else than the conditions you
10
      described a moment ago?
11
               THE DEFENDANT:
                               No.
               MR. SILVERMAN: Your Honor, may I have a moment?
12
13
               THE COURT: Of course.
14
               (Defendant and counsel conferred)
15
               THE DEFENDANT: My lawyer instructed me to tell you
16
      about I've seen a mental health expert, Eric Arnold, currently
17
      a social worker, Gordon Weiss, and a therapist at Rockland
18
      Daytop.
19
               THE COURT: Have you ever received care at a
20
      hospital -- other than what you've described, have you received
21
      any other care, including in a hospital, for any mental health
22
     problem?
23
               THE DEFENDANT: Not that I remember.
24
               THE COURT: In the past 24 hours, other than what
25
      you've just described to me, have you taken any medicine,
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1 pills, or drugs of any kind? THE DEFENDANT: I took Klonopin, Lorazepam - whatever, 2 3 I forget what the name brand is - and Lamictal. 4 THE COURT: In the last month, have you used alcohol 5 or any illegal drugs? 6 THE DEFENDANT: No. 7 THE COURT: And, again, your mind is clear today, you Do you understand what the nature of this proceeding is? 8 said. 9 THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, well, you've rendered your 10 decision on the in limine, and now we're doing the Faretta, 11 California v. Faretta hearing. 12 THE COURT: Just tell me, then, in your own words, 13 because we lawyers throw around case names willy-nilly, what do 14 you understand the purpose of what we're engaged in? 15 THE DEFENDANT: I haven't read the decision in quite 16 some time. I know it's for pro se. That's all of my 17 recollection of the opinion is. 18 THE COURT: Putting aside the opinion, what do you 19 understand the purpose of the conversation I had with 20 Mr. Silverman, and now the conversation I'm having with you, 21 what's the purpose of that, as you understand? 22 THE DEFENDANT: Well, for you to ascertain whether or 23 not I am competent enough to defend myself and whether I'll 24 comport myself in a certain way. That's what I assume.

THE COURT: From my perspective, the purpose of this

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      inquiry is prompted by your request --
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               THE DEFENDANT: Oh, okay.
 3
               THE COURT: -- for leave to represent you.
 4
               THE DEFENDANT: Oh, yes, my request. I'm thinking
      about what we're doing right now.
 5
 6
               THE COURT: Well, that's -- I see, yes, immediately in
 7
      the last few minutes, I'm assessing your competence, but in
      terms of the broader purpose of the whole line of questions
8
9
      that I've just begun on, do you understand what the purpose of
10
      this whole --
               THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, my request to go pro se.
11
12
               THE COURT:
                          Okay.
13
               Are you aware that you have a right, under the
      Constitution, to have an attorney represent you at a criminal
14
      trial?
15
16
               THE DEFENDANT: Yes. Under the Sixth Amendment, yes.
17
               THE COURT: Do you understand that you have the right,
18
      as well, to represent yourself in this criminal case, including
      at the trial?
19
20
               THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
21
               THE COURT: Have you ever attended law school?
22
               THE DEFENDANT:
                               No.
23
               THE COURT: Have you ever studied law?
24
               THE DEFENDANT:
                               Informally.
25
               THE COURT: What does that mean?
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THE DEFENDANT: Oh, well, you know, I -- not
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      currently, but, you know, while I was in jail, I did
 3
      LexisNexis. Prior to not being deprived of the internet, I did
      case texts. I read law journals on various topics. You know,
 4
 5
      I've downloaded them. I've printed them out, so I can have
6
      them.
 7
               THE COURT: Have you ever taken a class --
 8
               THE DEFENDANT: No.
9
               THE COURT: -- in the law?
10
               Even apart from being at law school as an
11
      undergraduate or anything like that, even at high school, have
12
      you ever taken a class in the law?
13
               THE DEFENDANT: I mean, there's been sections on bench
      law, but that's about it, but nothing...
14
15
               THE COURT: There's been no class you've ever taken at
16
      any level that was about the law; is that correct?
17
               THE DEFENDANT: No, not specifically.
18
               THE COURT: My statement was correct?
19
               THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
20
               THE COURT: Okay. All right.
21
               I think I know the answer to this, but I need you to
22
              Have you ever represented yourself in any legal
      answer.
23
     proceeding?
24
               THE DEFENDANT:
                              Yes.
25
               THE COURT: What legal proceeding was that?
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1	THE DEFENDANT: Civil.
2	THE COURT: Which case or cases?
3	THE DEFENDANT: The one before Judge Brodie and the
4	one before Judge Cogan.
5	THE COURT: Did you represent yourself for the
6	entirety of those proceedings or only part?
7	THE DEFENDANT: With Judge Cogan, I had a private
8	attorney that I fired, and then with Judge Brodie, it was all
9	by myself.
10	THE COURT: All what?
11	THE DEFENDANT: All by myself.
12	THE COURT: Let's focus on the case in front of Judge
13	Brodie.
14	What was the experience like representing yourself in
15	front of Judge Brodie?
16	THE DEFENDANT: The one time that I saw her in person,
17	she was pleasant, nice person. That's how I would describe
18	her.
19	THE COURT: How did you find the act of carrying out
20	the functions of a lawyer as a nonlawyer in that case?
21	THE DEFENDANT: I wasn't focused on I was just
22	focused on Betsy, so I don't know what to tell you.
23	THE COURT: You were focused on?
24	THE DEFENDANT: I was focused on Ms. Combier.
25	THE COURT: She was your adversary?

1	THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
2	THE COURT: Right. But if you had a case, you were
3	the plaintiff in that case in front of
4	THE DEFENDANT: I was the defendant, and I did a
5	cross-complaint.
6	THE COURT: Okay. In those capacities, did you have
7	to file legal papers?
8	THE DEFENDANT: Oh, yeah, definitely.
9	THE COURT: Either on your own or in response to the
10	other side?
11	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I did.
12	THE COURT: How did you find that project? How did
13	you find was that hard, were you able to accomplish what you
14	needed?
15	THE DEFENDANT: I think so. You know, whether I did
16	it right or wrong is another question.
17	THE COURT: Did you ever have to give an argument in
18	court or
19	THE DEFENDANT: No.
20	THE COURT: were you simply submitting papers?
21	THE DEFENDANT: Just submitting papers.
22	THE COURT: Did you ever have occasion in the case in
23	front of Judge Brodie to make an oral presentation to her about
24	an issue in the case?
25	THE DEFENDANT: She never required me; she only

1	required it of Ms. Combier.
2	THE COURT: So the extent of your functioning in the
3	role of a pro se lawyer was limited to the submission of
4	papers; is that correct?
5	THE DEFENDANT: Yep.
6	THE COURT: May I ask you what the outcome of the case
7	was?
8	THE DEFENDANT: Dismissed.
9	THE COURT: Well, you said that there were claims in
10	both directions. What happened to the claims against you?
11	THE DEFENDANT: Dismissed.
12	THE COURT: And what happened to the claims you
13	brought?
14	THE DEFENDANT: It was dismissed.
15	THE COURT: From the way did the judge write a
16	decision that dismissed all the claims?
17	THE DEFENDANT: Repeat that, your Honor.
18	THE COURT: How did it come to pass that the claims
19	were dismissed?
20	THE DEFENDANT: Judge Brodie asked for Magistrate Mann
21	to write a report, and she adopted that one.
22	THE COURT: I see.
23	And did Judge Mann's report recommend dismissal of
24	everybody's claims?
25	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I believe so.

THE COURT: Did Judge Mann's report say anything about 1 the arguments you had made either on your other side's claims 2 3 or in support of your claims? 4 THE DEFENDANT: If I say anything, I would -- I don't 5 remember. Honestly, she dismissed them, but I don't know the 6 exact wording, I don't know what was said. I don't remember. 7 THE COURT: Mr. Celli, again, under oath, I'm just trying to get a real feel on this. How comfortable did you 8 9 feel with legal materials, making arguments about cases, and 10 rules, and evidence? How comfortable did you feel doing that 11 in that case? 12 THE DEFENDANT: Well, based on what I've read, and 13 like I got annotated rules of evidence, I got annotated rules 14 of discovery -- not discovery -- rules of criminal procedure, 15 obviously, I read what I read, and then I assume that that's 16 the argument I will make and that I believe that's the right 17 argument. THE COURT: Did you feel, at times, that there were 18 concepts that you had difficulty understanding, legal concepts? 19 20 THE DEFENDANT: No. 21 THE COURT: Tell me about the case in front of Judge 22 Cogan. You said you had a private attorney --23 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 24 THE COURT: -- who you fired. 25 Briefly, what was the nature of the case in front of

Case 1:19-cr-00127-PAE-ST Document 145 Filed 04/22/21 Page 73 of 114 PageID #: 934 L46KCELC 1 Judge Cogan? 2 It was a Title 7. THE DEFENDANT: 3 THE COURT: And that's a case where you were the plaintiff, right? 4 5 THE DEFENDANT: Yep. 6 THE COURT: And you sued -- who did you sue again? 7 THE DEFENDANT: The DOE. 8 THE COURT: And who was your attorney? 9 THE DEFENDANT: Steve Morelli, and then it changed to 10 Mr. Tann because Morelli was arrested, and he was -- whatever. 11 THE COURT: So I take it you didn't fire Mr. Morelli, 12 he was forced to step down? 13 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 14 THE COURT: And then you hired a Mr. Tann? 15 THE DEFENDANT: Well, Mr. Tann took over the firm. THE COURT: I see. And you fired Mr. Tann? 16 17 THE DEFENDANT: Because of the ongoings between Betsy, 18 Randi, and my lawyer, which I had audio recordings. THE COURT: I lost the word. 19 20 THE DEFENDANT: The dealings with Betsy, Randi, and my 21 lawyer. 22 THE COURT: You thought there was something corrupt

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THE DEFENDANT: Basically from what Betsy told me,

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24

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yes.

about those dealings?

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               THE COURT: Okay. So, for that reason, you fired
     Mr. Tann?
 2
 3
               THE DEFENDANT: Yes, because he lied to me. He said
 4
      that -- he said that the people at the Department of Ed had
 5
      immunity, and then I told him that's not up to him to decide,
6
      that's up to the court to decide, whether employees have
 7
      qualified immunity. It wasn't up to him to decide not to put
8
      it in, it was up to --
9
               THE COURT: The judge?
10
               THE DEFENDANT: -- the judge.
11
               THE COURT: So what was the stage of the case -- where
12
      was the case at when you fired Mr. Tann?
13
               THE DEFENDANT: From the beginning, basically.
14
               THE COURT: What happened afterwards? What were the
15
      stages of the case after Mr. Tann left?
               THE DEFENDANT: The city moved for, I believe what's
16
17
      called, summary judgment. I believe that's what the motion
18
      was. I'm not remembering. It's been quite some time.
19
               THE COURT: And what happened next?
20
                              Judge Cogan said that the UFT had
               THE DEFENDANT:
      nothing to do with this, and it had everything to do it.
21
22
               THE COURT: Judge Cogan granted summary judgment to
23
      the defense?
24
               THE DEFENDANT:
                              Yes.
25
               THE COURT: And was any discovery taken in the case?
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1	THE DEFENDANT: Nope.
2	THE COURT: No depositions?
3	THE DEFENDANT: Nope.
4	THE COURT: No evidence?
5	THE DEFENDANT: Nope.
6	THE COURT: Did you, when you were representing
7	yourself, initiate any discovery, seek to take any discovery?
8	THE DEFENDANT: I didn't know anything about that at
9	that point. I was rushing through rushing to learn whatever
10	because of what was occurring. So I was behind the eightball.
11	Not that I know a lot now, but I know a little bit more than
12	what I knew then.
13	THE COURT: Look, you fired Mr. Tann, you were behind
14	the eightball, you didn't take discovery, and, therefore, no
15	discovery was taken, and Judge Cogan, based on that record,
16	entered summary judgment for the defense. Is that an accurate
17	
Ι,	summary?
18	summary? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, that's accurate.
18	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, that's accurate.
18 19	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, that's accurate. THE COURT: Do you believe that if you had taken
18 19 20	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, that's accurate. THE COURT: Do you believe that if you had taken discovery, that might have put you in a better position to
18 19 20 21	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, that's accurate. THE COURT: Do you believe that if you had taken discovery, that might have put you in a better position to either prevail or at least get beyond summary judgment?
18 19 20 21 22	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, that's accurate. THE COURT: Do you believe that if you had taken discovery, that might have put you in a better position to either prevail or at least get beyond summary judgment? THE DEFENDANT: If I were to present my evidence and
18 19 20 21 22 23	THE DEFENDANT: Yes, that's accurate. THE COURT: Do you believe that if you had taken discovery, that might have put you in a better position to either prevail or at least get beyond summary judgment? THE DEFENDANT: If I were to present my evidence and obtain evidence, probably, yes.

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or was fired, taken discovery, do you think if you had done 1 that, your case might have survived longer? 2 3 THE DEFENDANT: So, what I think now, under the full 4 credit -- under the full fair credit amendment, or whatever, from the highest court, because I mentioned them in my 5 6 complaint, I believe I could have filed a Rule 60, but --7 THE COURT: Sorry, I'm asking you just a guestion. 8 You very honestly said to me you were not familiar with what 9 the --10 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: -- how to proceed, and sometime 11 12 thereafter, you lose the case. And the actual question, 13 particularly given the nature of this proceeding, is: If you had been more up on the law, if you had been better at legal 14 15 practice, after Mr. Tann dropped away, do you think your case would have survived a little longer? 16 17 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 18 THE COURT: Okay. 19 Apart from this case, have you ever been a defendant 20 in a criminal case? 21 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 22 THE COURT: Tell me about that. 23 THE DEFENDANT: Two of them got dismissed and one of 24 them ended in a violation.

THE COURT: Can you elaborate, just take them one by

1 one, and tell me what the case was about and what happened? 2 THE DEFENDANT: The first two were possession of 3 marijuana, supposedly, and I got an ACD to both, and the second 4 one, I was misadvised by my attorney who I hired, and that 5 ended in a violation. 6 THE COURT: When you said you were misadvised by your 7 attorney, can you elaborate what you mean by that? THE DEFENDANT: Well, in order to convict for a DUI, 8 9 you have -- the prosecutor, the DA, has to prove that (a) you 10 took the substance or -- and then there's four elements - I 11 don't remember the third and fourth - and the second one is that you drove. Obviously, the second one is always proveable, 12 but the first one is what needed to be established. I tested 13 14 negative, so ... 15 THE COURT: Got it. Was there any proceeding in any of the criminal cases 16 17 you had where you represented yourself at any point? 18 THE DEFENDANT: No, not in that one. Well, for a 19 couple of months, but not really. 20 THE COURT: Did any of those cases result in a trial? 21 THE DEFENDANT: 22 THE COURT: Did any of those cases come close to being 23 at a trial? 24 THE DEFENDANT: No. 25 THE COURT: Did any of those cases involve any

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evidentiary hearing?
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               THE DEFENDANT:
                               Nope.
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               THE COURT: Did any of those cases involve the
      questioning in court of any witness?
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               THE DEFENDANT: Nope.
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               THE COURT: Did any of those cases involve oral
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      argument by a lawyer in court?
               THE DEFENDANT: There was one, and I wasn't privy to
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9
           They went into another room.
      it.
10
               THE COURT: Have you ever attended a criminal trial?
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               THE DEFENDANT:
                               No.
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               THE COURT:
                          Have you ever served as a juror sitting as
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      a juror in a trial?
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               THE DEFENDANT: I was selected, but the case settled.
               THE COURT: Okay.
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               Other than that jury duty occasion, have you ever
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      served as a juror?
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               THE DEFENDANT: No.
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               THE COURT: Have you ever seen jury selection
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      conducted?
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               THE DEFENDANT: Not personally, no.
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               THE COURT: Are you familiar with the Federal Rules of
23
      Evidence?
24
                               Well, I have an annotated book.
               THE DEFENDANT:
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               THE COURT: I'm holding up the 2019 Federal Criminal
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Code, but there is a section in here that is the Federal Rules
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      of Evidence. Are you familiar with those?
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               THE DEFENDANT: I have a whole book that's probably
 4
      that size.
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               THE COURT: Okay. But having -- I've got a lot of
      whole books that I'm not familiar with. Are you familiar with
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      the Federal Rules of Evidence, not only a book?
               THE DEFENDANT: I've read certain passages. I haven't
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     read all of them.
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               THE COURT: What is your level of familiarity with the
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      rules?
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               THE DEFENDANT: From the ones I focused on, the 400
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      and the 800, they seem straightforward to me.
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               THE COURT: They seem straightforward to you?
               What are the Rule 800 rules about?
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               THE DEFENDANT: Well, you just went over them.
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               THE COURT: I'm --
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               THE DEFENDANT: Sorry, sorry, sorry.
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               THE COURT: It's not about me. I know those rules; I
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      could represent myself.
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               THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
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               THE COURT: That's not what this is about. This is
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      about you. What are the Rule 800 rules about?
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               THE DEFENDANT: Admission of statements --
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               THE COURT: No, no, don't look it up. I'm asking you,
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because I'm trying to get a sense of whether you can represent yourself at trial without a disaster happening. What do the 800 rules relate to? THE DEFENDANT: Admissions of statements, out-of-court statements. THE COURT: Out-of-court statements, all right. Do you have -- that's a series of rules that comes up a great deal during a trial. THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: Is there anything further you can tell me about what the rules say, those rules? THE DEFENDANT: I don't have them set to memory. have it in here. THE COURT: I'm not asking you from memory, but I am trying to get a sense of whether you have any facility with them at all. I appreciate that you've read something there, but could you even give me 30 seconds of knowledge about the Rule -- what you are calling the Rule 800 rules? THE DEFENDANT: So, they deal with conspiracy, statements of conspirators. They deal with opposing statements from opposing parties, whether it's from the defendant or from the government. What's the other two? I'm blanking out.

THE COURT: What do the 400 rules relate to?

25 THE DEFENDANT: I don't remember that at all.

can't tell you more than that.

1 THE COURT: All right. What about the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, is 2 3 that something that you have any familiarity with? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. Like -- so Rule 12 is, like, for 4 5 That's what I see in my mind, but I just don't remember them off -- I have them. I don't remember off the top 6 7 of my head. THE COURT: Do you understand that your lawyer is 8 9 familiar with the Federal Rules of Evidence? 10 THE DEFENDANT: Oh, definitely. 11 THE COURT: Do you understand that your lawyer is familiar with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure? 12 13 THE DEFENDANT: Oh, definitely. 14 THE COURT: Do you understand that we will follow closely both sets of those rules at trial? 15 16 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 17 THE COURT: And do you understand that, ultimately, 18 the decisions that a judge makes are supposed to be guided by 19 those rules to make sure that there is an objective set of 20 standards and rules that governs a trial, and it's not by whim 21 or caprice? That's what I'm supposed to do, that's my job. 22 Do you understand that? 23 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 24 THE COURT: And do you understand, therefore, that 25 throughout a trial, I am either asking the lawyers for their

views as to how certain rules apply, for example, certain evidence or certain requests, or the lawyers, on their own initiative, are bringing to my attention their perspectives as to how certain rules apply?

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Oh, that's what they did right now, yes, all five of us.

THE COURT: But do you understand that in a fast-moving trial, if a witness was over here in the witness stand, and the government put a document in front of them and asked a question to that witness, your lawyer might get up and say, Judge, Rule 801, or Rule 403, or might make a short argument as to why something the government is doing, Rule 609, is inappropriate? Do you understand that that's very much the work of the lawyer --

THE DEFENDANT: That's the practice.

THE COURT: -- in a trial, it's about applying a fairly dense set of rules of evidence to a fast-moving set of situations, and the lawyer is essentially quickly decoding what has just happened and interpreting it in the light of the rules of evidence?

Do you understand that that's the job of the trial lawyer?

THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, that's the craft they have, and they've honed it. They've worked a trial more than once, so

they've honed their skills. That's their craft.

THE COURT: Indeed. Look, I will tell you before I took the bench, that's what I used to do, and it's not something that you learn doing one trial, it's many, and you get more and more comfortable. There is a point like writing a bicycle or learning a foreign language where you feel like you've achieved fluency, but you always get better, but it's a longer and arduous process informed by experience.

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you have any experience that would qualify you to do that?

THE DEFENDANT: Well, I do that as a teacher. I make quick assessments, and quick judgments, and responses to what happens in my room.

THE COURT: Sure. And I appreciate that. All of us in our own lives have to think fast in our own ways.

THE DEFENDANT: Yeah.

THE COURT: But this is a unique vocabulary. And, for example, if you simply got up and said I object, as a judge, I would then need to say rule, what basis. Do you have anything in your experience that would enable you to answer that next question — what basis, what rule?

THE DEFENDANT: That -- that would be my own account because --

1 THE COURT: That's a handicap. THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I know it's a handicap. 2 3 THE COURT: It's not a handicap like a stroke for a 4 That's like being blind for a golfer. You need to be golfer. 5 able to see what's going on. If you don't know the rules, if 6 the government is offering something that's inadmissible under 7 the rules, unless I catch it on my own, you would not be of any 8 assistance to me if you were representing yourself. 9 Do you understand that? 10 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 11 THE COURT: Do you understand that an attorney, by 12 study and experience, is far better able to follow and apply 13 those rules than you are? 14 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 15 THE COURT: Mr. Celli, if you were to represent 16 yourself, would you have some game plan between now and trial 17 to suddenly put yourself in the position where you could do 18 what it takes experienced lawyers years to do in terms of 19 having the skill set to ably defend against inadmissible 20 evidence, or improper arguments, or to admit evidence, or to 21 make proper arguments? How in the weeks between now and trial 22 would you learn those skills? 23 THE DEFENDANT: Read and reread all the books I have. 24 THE COURT: Do you understand that your criminal trial 25 will begin on May 17th of this year?

1 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, but I have a request because -but we'll deal with that after. 2 3 THE COURT: Do you understand that I have identified 4 the May 17th trial date as a firm trial date? This case 5 involves an event that allegedly happened on November 12th of 6 2018, which would be two and a half years and five days before 7 the trial date. Do you understand that? 8 9 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 10 THE COURT: All right. 11 Do you understand that the one count against you will 12 be tried then, and that a jury will decide whether you are 13 quilty of that crime? 14 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 15 THE COURT: And do you understand that, just to be concrete about what the crime is, Count One, the only count in 16 17 the indictment, charges you with transmitting interstate 18 threats to injure a person of another in violation of a statute 19 called Title 18, United States Code, Section 875(c)? 20 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 21 THE COURT: Do you understand that that crime is a 22 felony? 23 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 24 THE COURT: And do you understand that the maximum 25 offense for that count in terms of imprisonment is five years

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1 in prison? 2 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 3 THE COURT: Do you understand that apart from 4 imprisonment, if you're convicted of that crime, the offense 5 carries other potential penalties? 6 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 7 THE COURT: Do you understand that, for example, the Court can impose a fine of the greatest of \$250,000, twice the 8 9 gross pecuniary loss to another person, or twice the gross 10 pecuniary gain to you? Presumably that means \$250,000, given 11 the nature of the crime, but do you understand that apart from 12 losing your liberty for up to five years, you could lose a lot 13 of money? 14 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 15

THE COURT: Do you understand, as well, that the crime carries a special assessment of \$1,000?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

MS. KARMIGIOS: \$100.

THE COURT: \$100, I'm sorry, my bad.

Sorry, thank you.

And do you understand, as well, that following any term of imprisonment, the Court would have the authority to impose a term of supervised release, which would mean that you would be under court supervision potentially for a period of several years?

1	THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
2	THE COURT: Do you understand that if you were
3	convicted at a trial, one of the factors that a judge would
4	have to consider in deciding a just and reasonable sentence
5	would be what are called the sentencing guidelines?
6	THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
7	THE COURT: Have you discussed the sentencing
8	guidelines with Mr. Silverman?
9	THE DEFENDANT: No, but I've read them and I've
10	read them. I printed it out while I was in jail.
11	THE COURT: Do you understand that if you were to
12	represent go ahead.
13	THE DEFENDANT: Oh, yes, yes. Sorry, yes.
14	THE COURT: Yes, what?
15	THE DEFENDANT: I did discuss them.
16	THE COURT: I was surprised to hear that you hadn't.
17	THE DEFENDANT: I'm sorry.
18	THE COURT: That's okay. All right.
19	Do you understand that if you were to represent
20	yourself, it's not my job, as the judge, to advise you how to
21	try your case?
22	THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
23	THE COURT: I'm trying to be solicitous of your
24	interests here, but, in the end, during a trial, I'm a neutral,
25	and I can't tell you, you know, it would be better if you

cross-examined that witness on the following; I can't do that, it's not my job.

THE DEFENDANT: No, it's not. It's your job to be nonbiased.

THE COURT: Do you understand that the rule of self-representation, where granted, is not a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom, it's not a license not to comply with the relevant rules of procedure or substantive law, you need to abide by all the rules?

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: And if I tell you that a question is improper or a statement is improper, you need to abide by the Court's rulings or you are risking having your line of inquiry shut down and risking potentially being held in contempt. Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you understand that the Court may terminate a defendant's self-representation if the defendant deliberately engages in serious and obstructive misconduct?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you understand that the government has the obligation at trial to prove you guilty through the use of admissible evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

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               THE COURT: Do you understand that you have no
      obligation to prove that you are innocent?
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               THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
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               THE COURT: Do you understand that you have no
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      obligation to put on any evidence at trial?
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               THE DEFENDANT: Yep.
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               THE COURT: Do you understand, however, that you also
      have the right to object to the government's evidence based on
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      the rules of evidence, and to cross-examine the government's
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      witnesses, compliant with the rules of evidence?
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               THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
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               THE COURT: Have you ever questioned a witness in any
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      court or hearing of any sort?
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               THE DEFENDANT:
                               Nope.
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               THE COURT: Have you ever testified in any proceeding?
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               THE DEFENDANT:
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               THE COURT: Do you understand that you would have the
      right to call your own witnesses, offer evidence, and subpoena
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      witnesses to come to court and testify on your behalf?
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               THE DEFENDANT: Yeah.
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               THE COURT: Do you know how to do that?
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               THE DEFENDANT: No.
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               THE COURT: Do you understand that, at a trial, you
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      would have the right to take the stand, and under oath, testify
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      in your own defense?
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1 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: Do you understand, however, that you also 2 3 have the right not to testify --4 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 5 THE COURT: -- and if you don't testify, I will 6 instruct the jury that they are not to hold that decision 7 against you in any way? 8 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. And the prosecutor can't make 9 any comments about it. 10 THE COURT: Right. 11 Do you understand that if you want to tell - this is 12 very important - if you want to tell the jury your version of 13 events in your own words, the only way you can do that is to 14 take the stand and testify in your own behalf under oath? 15 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: In other words, if you were representing 16 17 yourself at trial, and you didn't expose yourself to examination by the government, you couldn't, then, get up in 18 19 your jury address and say let me tell you what happened; you 20 can't do that, you can only comment on the evidence that's been 21 received at trial. Do you understand that? 22 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 23 THE COURT: Do you understand that by acting as your

THE COURT: Do you understand that by acting as your own attorney at trial, the jury may draw inferences about you as a person and about what you did in this case or know about

the events of this case that they would not be able to draw if 1 2 an attorney represented you at trial? 3 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 4 THE COURT: Do you understand that? 5 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 6 THE COURT: Even if you don't take the stand at trial 7 and testify as a witness, you understand that the rights you have as a criminal defendant, including the right to remain 8 9 silent under the Fifth Amendment, may be undermined because the 10 jury may draw impressions about you because of how you chose to 11 conduct your defense at trial? 12 THE DEFENDANT: I've read that, yes. 13 THE COURT: Do you understand that that is correct, 14 that a jury might draw negative inferences about a defendant 15 based on the way he or she conducted himself or herself? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, of course. I -- the D.C. Circuit 16 17 Federal Defenders have a whole thing about pro se people and 18 the way juries respond to it. 19 THE COURT: You understand that that would be a risk 20 for a pro se defendant? 21 THE DEFENDANT: 22 THE COURT: Do you understand that proceeding pro se 23 may undermine your attempt to establish a defense? 24 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 25 THE COURT: What types of evidence do you

understand -- well, no, let me just ask the government.

Government, in category, what types of evidence will you be offering, do you expect to offer at trial?

MS. KARMIGIOS: We'll be offering testimony from the United States Marshals, documentary evidence in the form of emails -- I'm sorry, your Honor, can you hear me -- testimony from United States Marshals, as well as emails and other documentary evidence, including the limited evidence about the civil litigations that your Honor has ruled on.

THE COURT: I take it there would also be, from what we covered earlier, the postarrest statement?

MS. KARMIGIOS: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: And postarrest prison calls?

MS. KARMIGIOS: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

Do you understand, Mr. Celli, that an attorney would have experience and skill in objecting to aspects of that evidence and cross-examining the witnesses, skills that you do not have?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you understand that an attorney is skilled at cross-examining government witnesses, examining their motives to testify, examining perhaps their prior bad acts, exposing their prior inconsistent statements, offering -- drawing out things that they know that are helpful to your

case?

Do you understand that a skilled attorney knows how to do those things?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you understand that attorneys know how to ask these questions without drawing information out that would hurt you, and that they're in a position to make judgments about when it's better to stay mum and not ask a question because the answer may hurt you?

Do you understand that that's part of an attorney's skill set?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you understand that if you did ask questions of government witnesses, you run the risk that the jury may assume that you know or did certain things because of the type of questions you asked?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: In other words, an attorney can do certain things without creating the same potential inference about what you knew than might exist if you put the same question or a question like it to a witness?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you understand that if you're convicted at trial, you will have the right to appeal that conviction?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: And do you understand that often, convicted defendants complain on appeal that their attorneys didn't represent them well enough at trial?

THE DEFENDANT: And I even read a case where someone

who was allowed to represent themself pro se appealed to the Second Circuit because they were — that the attorney's ineffective, like — they went through this whole thing and then they said they were ineffective, which I think that person should have gotten over...

THE COURT: Look, let me be as blunt as I can.

Defendants often say that they deserve a new trial on appeal because their attorney made an error at trial or failed to do something during the trial that he or she should have done.

Do you understand that that's a very common point of attack for a defendant who's been convicted on appeal?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: And do you understand that if you represented yourself at trial, that argument would be lost to you? You would not be able to blame an attorney for a trial error if you represented yourself, an attorney did not represent you at trial. Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: And do you understand that if you represent yourself at trial and are convicted, you will not be able to complain on appeal that you should have had a lawyer?

1 THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you understand that if you represent yourself at trial and are convicted, you will not be able to argue that you made an error and that you should have done things differently, the decisions you make at trial will be your decisions, you'll own them, and you will be bound by your decisions even if they put you in jail for a period of time?

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Has anyone threatened you or anyone else in order to convince you to proceed to trial without a lawyer to represent you?

THE DEFENDANT: No.

THE COURT: Has anyone promised you any benefit if you proceed to trial without an attorney?

THE DEFENDANT: Nope.

THE COURT: I want you to know that if you gave up your right to be represented by an attorney, and I permitted that, in my judgment, you would be making an exceptionally unwise decision.

THE DEFENDANT: I even had friends who told me that.

THE COURT: Well, be that as it may, I'm a neutral here, but with a lot of experience in this system, and I'm sitting here telling you and asking you to make sure -- I want to make sure you understand that, in my judgment, for you to

represent yourself here would be profoundly unwise.

THE DEFENDANT: And I'm -- my response -- what I was trying to convey is that I spoke to even my friends, and they even believe that's a dumb move. I just wanted to convey that.

THE COURT: Okay.

THE DEFENDANT: So it's not a decision --

THE COURT: I'm glad your friends agree with me, but do you understand that it is my view, with the --

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: -- experience that I have, the perspective I have, and the knowledge I have about this case, that it is a profoundly unwise decision for you in this case to represent yourself?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay.

Do you understand that, in my view, you would be far better off if you were represented by an experienced criminal defense attorney?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: And I'll put it very bluntly. This is a triable case, and by a triable cases, it means that somebody looking at it from the outside can imagine multiple outcomes coming from this. This is a case that could be won or lost. Do you understand that, in my judgment, if you choose to represent yourself, you are materially increasing the chances

that you will be convicted of a federal felony with all that that involves?

That is my opinion. Do you understand that is my judgment?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: I want to elaborate a little bit on that, because, in my view, Mr. Celli, there are particular features of this case that make it unusually important for you to be represented by an attorney and make it especially, in my view, unwise for you to represent yourself, and I've taken some time today to write these out to share them with you. And I'm doing it because I'm concerned that you would be making a very bad and a very self-destructive decision if you decide to represent yourself, and I hope you'll listen to me because I'm going beyond the usual script here and offering some thoughts about this particular case because I want you to make an informed decision. This may be the most important decision you make in your life. Okay?

THE DEFENDANT: Uh-huh.

THE COURT: It may not feel that way now, but if you're convicted, and you're sentenced to a material term of federal custody, you may be sitting there thinking what was I thinking, I should have listened to that guy. So I'm asking you to listen to that guy right now. Here goes.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

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THE COURT: And I'm going to focus on just one by one on three different aspects of the case, in particular, where, in my judgment, the lawyer could really make a positive difference for you relative to self-representation. This is by no means a complete list. It captures only some of the areas in which, in my judgment, a lawyer would help, and self-representation could be fatally self-destructive.

First, in a case involving alleged threats, the defendant's state of mind and intent, what's going on up here, is an unusually important issue. You heard me earlier review the elements of Section 875(c). A skilled trial lawyer can help influence how a jury assesses the defendant's state of mind and intent. A lawyer can do so through examination of witnesses, including cross-examination of witnesses whom the government has called. A lawyer can also do so by offering exhibits into evidence that bear on the defendant's state of mind and intent. A lawyer seeking to persuade the jury as to his client's state of mind and intent can also make evidentiary arguments why certain exhibits can be considered only for certain limited purposes. Such a lawyer can ask the Court to give the jury limiting instructions, which the lawyer will, word for word, propose. A lawyer can also make arguments as to why the evidence does not establish beyond a reasonable doubt the required intent.

These are all challenging high-end aspects of a

lawyer's work. They require training, experience, and subtlety, and care, and a command, a deep command, of the rules of evidence. They require an innate sense of what will fly with a jury and what will not.

Do you understand that a person without legal training and trial experience may do a far less job admitting evidence with respect to intent and persuading the jury with respect to the issue of intent?

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: That's category one.

Category two: There are two civil lawsuits in which you participated may play an important role in this case. I have asked counsel to negotiate in the hope of reaching agreement as to the scope of the information about those lawsuits that will be put before the jury within the boundaries that I gave earlier. You heard my ruling earlier on that.

It may be that the parties agree, and it may be that I need to resolve disputes about that. Regardless, I expect there will be, as government counsel said, witness testimony about those lawsuits. There is considerable, grave risk to you about how those lawsuits are presented to the jury.

Questioning of witnesses may open the door to aspects of those lawsuits that are profoundly unhelpful to you before the jury. I have only limited exposure to the lawsuits, read only what

I've learned in the papers in this case and a little bit about what my law clerk was able to find today on the public docket, so that I had some understanding of what the publicly filed papers said, but just for one example, I understand there were allegations in the lawsuit before Judge Brodie that you sent disparaging communications over email. A jury hearing about that might regard the emails you sent in this case in a considerably more unfavorable light. A skilled lawyer will be much more likely than a nonlawyer to carefully handle witness questions and arguments before the Court in these areas, so as not to open the door to potentially unhelpful facts.

Do you understand that a person such as you, without legal training, may do a vastly less good job presenting evidence about the prior lawsuit and making sure that you are not needlessly harmed by the evidence that is received about those lawsuits?

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, but I also understand that there are certain facts that are hidden.

THE COURT: Be that as it may, the rules of evidence, not your perception of what's being hidden, will govern what is admissible. But if you were to, say, representing yourself, make some accusation to a witness, you can open the door to a dump truck of bad evidence from those trials coming in about you that otherwise might not just because you felt that

something was being hidden, and in that respect, your desire to express yourself and say something about something being hidden might feel good in the moment, but it will feel pretty terrible when ten minutes of bad stuff comes rolling in because you opened the door, and it will feel really, really bad if you wind up in the MCC afterwards.

The point here is that this is exactly --

THE DEFENDANT: Oh --

THE COURT: One moment.

This is exactly why you want a lawyer managing the process of witnesses, so as not to open up those doors.

THE DEFENDANT: So what happened with Judge Brodie is that I filed too many -- wait --

THE COURT: No, no, no, no, no, no. This is exactly why you shouldn't be representing yourself. This is not about what happened before Judge Brodie, and we're not going to be litigating whether she was right, the other side was right, you were right. That's not going to be part of this trial. This trial is going to be about whether or not the elements of Section 875(c) are established or not beyond a reasonable doubt based on the emails that you allegedly sent on November 12th, 2018. And it's precisely poking at the trials involving — before Judge Brodie and Cogan that creates a risk that evidence that I have held is not properly before the jury could come out and in a light that would be profoundly unfavorable to you.

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My point is: Do you understand that a party representing himself is creating a huge risk that negative, harmful, prejudicial information from those lawsuits could come out in a way that hurts you? THE DEFENDANT: I quess. THE COURT: You don't believe me, do you? THE DEFENDANT: No, because my specific intent is to get justice for what was deprived from me with those --THE COURT: If you are going to get justice for those lawsuits, you're going to have to go somewhere else because you've been charged here as a criminal defendant, and the issue is whether or not you committed the crimes. THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: You will get justice in terms of getting a procedurally fair and evidentiarily based verdict as to the criminal charge against you, but whatever happened civilly is not going to be litigated here, but your handling of the evidence through questioning of witnesses about that could also result in badly harming your chances of prevailing in this That's all I want to make sure you understand. case. THE DEFENDANT: Sure. THE COURT: Is that a yes? THE DEFENDANT: Huh? THE COURT: Is that yes, you understand?

Yes.

THE DEFENDANT:

THE COURT: All right.

Third: The jury will likely be watching you,

Mr. Celli, during this trial. Juries tend to have an eye on
the defendant. The way you behave and carry yourself in the
presence of the jury may influence, even subliminally, the way
jurors view you, including whether they see you as a person
capable of making true threats. So, to the extent that you
might display a quick temper, to the extent that you might
display a degree of volatility, to the extent you might display
a degree of agitation, to the extent you might display an
inability to maintain control of your emotions, or words, or to
be on focus, all of that could play very much to your
disadvantage.

I will be very, very direct with you. Thinking back even to the initial conference we had in this case, which was by telephone, you displayed some of those characteristics. The lawyer represents you at trial. You will not have any occasion to say any words before the jury unless you choose to testify. You will have the significant advantage of not giving anything away. You can be a placid, stone-faced participant.

If, however, you represent yourself, you will be in the position of being on stage and speaking frequently. You will be questioning witnesses, presumably, you'll be making objections, if you can formulate one consistent with the rules of evidence to questions by the other side, you'll be making

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objections to evidence offered by the other side, you would have the right to make jury addresses. If you failed to abide by an evidentiary ruling of the Court, the Court may be required to direct you, in increasingly firm language, to abide by, to obey, the Court's ruling. If you do not do that in the presence of the jury, they may draw a negative conclusion about your desire to comply with the law because if you can't comply with the rules in the courtroom, the premise might be, why should we assume that he was complying with the law in the offense that's been charged. It is possible, if you were representing yourself, you would be triggered to say something in anger or to make an intemperate accusation in the heat of the moment in trial. So it is possible - and I'm being very direct with you - that your temperament and the way you carry yourself while carrying out those speaking functions could harm you badly in the jury's eyes.

Do you understand that if your case is in the hands of an attorney at trial, there will be far less opportunities for moments like that to occur in which something you say or do could lead the jury to draw an unhelpful negative inference about you?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: All right.

Counsel, it is -- Mr. Celli, look, I'm trying to be responsible, and share with you, and unpack for you the real

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1 risks I see here. Would you like to discuss this issue further 2 with Mr. Silverman? 3 THE DEFENDANT: What I would like to discuss is what 4 has occurred to me since day one in this courtroom, not your 5 courtroom. 6 THE COURT: You've never been in this courtroom. 7 one, that is today. You've never been here until two hours 8 ago. 9 THE DEFENDANT: No, no. What I mean is this whole 10 trial process. 11 THE COURT: Sorry, Mr. Celli, I'm focusing on the 12 issue at hand here. This is not going to be an opportunity to 13 have grievances about other things that happened earlier in the 14 prosecution, any more than the trial would be an opportunity 15 for you to have grievances about the counterparties, the 16 opposing parties, in the civil cases. That's not what this is 17 going to be about. 18 So, you need to answer my question. Do you want to 19 discuss this extremely important issue in your life further 20 with Mr. Silverman? 21 THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, okay. But, like, you're telling 22 me my intent. Like I know what I intended. 23 THE COURT: I don't know what you intended.

THE COURT: I don't know what you intended. The evidence --

THE DEFENDANT: I intended -- the UFT denied me a

grievance, and I shitted in my pants. Okay?

THE COURT: You what?

THE DEFENDANT: I shitted in my pants because the UFT denied me a fair grievance. A principal put her hand in my face. Randi threatened to expose my rape. Betsy, through Randi, said that if I continued, that she would find a way to be vindictive. My HIV status has been put on the internet more than once.

THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Celli.

THE DEFENDANT: And -- wait, wait -- Betsy has harassed me for five years, and it's the Court's fault is why we're here, because it is a crime, and I wrote this in my thing, and I sent it to the senators, everybody that's involved, the common denominator is Senator Schumer and Randi Weingarten.

THE COURT: Mr. Celli, what you have just said is

Exhibit A why you should not be representing yourself at trial,

because virtually nothing you've just said in the last 60 or 90

seconds would be admissible for any purpose in this trial or be

properly said before the jury. Were you to do that, you would

be immediately reprimanded for speaking about subjects that

have nothing to do with the case —

THE DEFENDANT: That's my intent.

THE COURT: -- that are not admissible, and if you tried to question a witness about those areas, I expect,

depending on the question, the objection would likely be sustained, and, more to the point, if you tried to poke around in those areas, because they really have nothing to do with whether you made a threat or not, and with the requisite intent, there is a real possibility that the door would open to other information about those lawsuits.

Do you understand --

THE DEFENDANT: So February 5th, 2019, Ms. Betsy said everything that was done prior in those lawsuits was okay, and then I had other people from the DOJ said that what was done to me is a crime, so -- and that goes back to the 800 section.

THE COURT: All right. Look, I appreciate that.

THE DEFENDANT: That's why I wrote --

THE COURT: I fully appreciate the sincerity of the feelings you have about the people you've mentioned and those past events in your life, but I also need to tell you that the focus of this trial will be tightly focused on the conduct alleged and the acts of your state of mind in connection with it. I think it would be productive for you to spend a little more time with Mr. Silverman, and I really have tried to bend over backwards to explain why I'm worried that if you represented yourself, you would be harming yourself potentially in an unforgettable bad way. It could be the worst decision of your life, and I'm really being very blunt with you.

This is what I would like to do. I'm going to confer

with Mr. Smallman, but what I'd like to do is have you and Mr. Silverman speak. And I will tell you that Mr. Silverman's advocacy in this case has been absolutely first rate. He is a counselor who has my esteem, and he has my respect for the quality and rigor of his advocacy. He has exactly the skill set that you need to formulate your position as best as possible within the language of the courtroom. I would like —

THE DEFENDANT: I agree with that.

THE COURT: Good, I'm glad.

And, Mr. Silverman, you have my thanks for taking on the representation, as I've said before.

MR. SILVERMAN: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: But I'm going to speak with Mr. Smallman about a time when we can meet. What I have in mind is an ex parte conversation because I want to make sure that I understand the nature of the relationship between you two, and I want to -- Mr. Silverman, because -- Mr. Celli, because I respect the fact that you appear to have misgivings about advice Mr. Silverman has given you, and it may be worth my exploring those with you because my assessment of those issues may be informative here.

Mr. Smallman, let's identify a date.

(Pause)

THE COURT: Counsel, Mr. Smallman helpfully reminds me that on April 16th, a week from Friday, we already have a

conference at 2:00 p.m. May I suggest that I meet with 1 Mr. Celli and Mr. Silverman at 1:00 p.m.? That way, I'm not 2 3 assuming you've got the contiguous time frame. 4 Government, I'll ask you to be available, as well, at 5 2:00. I don't know how long the conversation with me and the 6 defense may take, so bring reading material, but, that way, at 7 least I'm not adding a conference to everybody's day. And can I just ask - this has worked very well -8 9 Mr. Silverman, do I have your consent to do this conference 10 again in this courtroom? 11 MR. SILVERMAN: Yes, your Honor. And I would just 12 note I have a sentencing at 10:30 in the Eastern District that 13 morning, but I should be able to be here by 1:00 p.m. 14 THE COURT: Very good. Mr. Smallman tells me, for independent reasons, it may 15 be easier for my chambers to do this on Thursday, the 15th, in 16 17 the afternoon, and that may also get rid of any potential pinch with Mr. Silverman's schedule. Are counsel free that day? 18 19 MS. KARMIGIOS: Yes, your Honor. 20 MR. SILVERMAN: Yes, your Honor. 21 THE COURT: May I suggest, then, that -- Mr. Smallman, 22 can we say 2:00 p.m. on Thursday? 23 How about 2:00 p.m. on Thursday, April 15? 24 MR. SILVERMAN: Yes, your Honor. Is that for just --25

THE COURT: That's just for you two. We'll keep the

conference on for the following day.

MS. KARMIGIOS: Okay.

THE COURT: That way, I can take all the time I need with Mr. Silverman and Mr. Celli, without feeling my time is cramped. So we'll keep the conference on for Friday with all concerned, but I will use Thursday for that purpose.

Mr. Silverman, I think even if you and Mr. Celli — even if Mr. Celli reaches what I think is the wise judgment here, which is to keep you on as his trial counsel, even if you get to that point, I still want to meet with you, because I think I may be of service here, and I think it's a useful conversation, and I also want to create a clear record that I have followed up with these questions just to make sure there are no loose ends.

MR. SILVERMAN: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: So, regardless of the state of play, while I'm happy to receive a letter from you, if you find it useful, alerting me to the state of play before we gather, I still want to meet you Thursday of next week at 2:00 p.m. So, in effect, we're adding a Thursday conference and keeping the Friday one intact. The Friday is for everybody; the Thursday is just for the Court and the defense. Given the nature of the conference, it will be an ex parte conference. There will be a court reporter, of course, but the transcript will be maintained under seal.

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               Mr. Silverman, I take it this is a sensible approach?
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               MR. SILVERMAN: Yes. And we appreciate your Honor's
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      time.
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               THE COURT:
                          Okay. Government, you are -- again, you
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      are fine with that?
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               MS. KARMIGIOS: Yes, your Honor.
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               THE COURT: And I think I've secured this, but,
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      government, you consent to doing this here in this courtroom?
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               MS. KARMIGIOS: Yes, your Honor.
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               THE COURT: And defense?
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               MR. SILVERMAN: Yes, your Honor.
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               THE COURT: All right. I'm going to break in a
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     moment, but before we do, look, we are still very much on for
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      trial on the 17th, nothing about the schedule has changed.
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     We'll use the meeting on Friday, the 16th, to take stock of the
      trial, which, at that point, will be a month and a day away.
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               Is there anything, though, at this point that I can be
      helpful on in clarifying for counsel? Anything that I can be
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      of use on?
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               MR. SILVERMAN: Oh --
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               THE COURT: Sorry, counsel.
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               THE DEFENDANT:
                               Sorry.
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               MR. SILVERMAN: Your Honor, may I confer with my
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      client?
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               THE COURT: Yes. I was about to ask the government
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1 first, though. 2 MS. KARMIGIOS: Not at this time, your Honor. 3 you. 4 THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead, Mr. Silverman. 5 (Defendant and counsel conferred) MR. SILVERMAN: Your Honor, Mr. Celli would like me to 6 7 bring to the Court's attention that he submitted a letter that 8 I saw early this afternoon to the Attorney General, Gerald 9 Garland, concerning allegations of judicial misconduct. 10 THE DEFENDANT: No, it's -- no, it's the conduct of 11 the AUSA and the fact that they need waivers -- well, I know 12 Ms. Benson didn't have a waiver, and she lied about her --13 THE COURT: Sorry, I didn't hear. The conduct of who? 14 MR. SILVERMAN: Mr. Celli said the conduct of the 15 AUSAs, so he has --16 THE DEFENDANT: That's why I wrote to the senate 17 judiciary, because they handle those complaints, and the U.S. Marshals, and I sent it -- I have motions that I wanted to 18 19 bring up, and I sent them my intent, my subjective intent, 20 which I just told you. 21 THE COURT: It's news to me that you have filed those 22 submissions. 23 THE DEFENDANT: No, no, I didn't file them. 24 I gave them to the senate and ethics committee because them. 25 of what I believe is happening.

THE COURT: All right. Look, Mr. Celli, you are at liberty to make those submissions. If somebody wants to bring a claim to my attention that bears on anything relevant to this case, you're at liberty to do so, bounded by the Rules of Professional Responsibility and truth-telling. And if something crosses my plate, I will act appropriately on it.

At this point, I'm understanding, Mr. Silverman, that nothing has been filed in this case?

MR. SILVERMAN: That's my understanding. I learned of this just before today's conference, but I am not entirely --

THE COURT: Mr. Celli, you're not helping yourself necessarily by raising extraneous matters.

THE DEFENDANT: No, no, I want to file a judicial complaint against Ms. Scanlon -- excuse me, Magistrate Scanlon.

THE COURT: Magistrate who?

THE DEFENDANT: Magistrate Scanlon.

MR. SILVERMAN: If I may, I believe Mr. Celli has respectfully requested a modification to his bail to allow him to contact the Second Circuit, so that he can file a complaint for judicial misconduct against Magistrate Judge Scanlon who arraigned him in the Eastern District of New York.

THE COURT: I have no context with which to view that application. I just don't know what has been -- I don't know what his bail conditions are that are inconsistent with that.

I'm happy to receive a written application and get a proper

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      response from the other side.
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               All right. With that, then, we stand adjourned. I
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      look forward to seeing the defense in a week. Thank you.
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               MR. SILVERMAN: Thank you, your Honor.
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